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R a b b i t  w h a t  a re  you  doing?  
I 'm  g o in g  to k i l l  the  e lephant .  
Can y o u  r e a l l y  do that? 
Well,  I ' l l  t ry . . .  a n d  t ry  again !
- W a s u k u m a  Proverb
Inques t ,  A u to p s y  o r  Inqu iry?  To UNPAAERD and  A f te r
The S e p te m b e r  1991 inques t  into the Un i ted Na t io ns  P r o g r a m m e  of Act ion  for  
A f r i can  E cono m ic  R ecove ry  and D e ve lop m e n t ,  1986-90, (UNPAAERD),  based 
on the  O A U 's  A f r ican  P r io r i t y  P r o g r a m m e  fo r  E c o n o m ic  Recons t ruc t ion  
(APPER),  w i l l  be a n o th e r  rev iew  of the past, a n o th e r  re v ise d  re -eva lua t io n  of 
t r e n d s  and  causes,  a n o th e r  set of p ro g n o s t i c a t io n s  of the  fu tu re  and another 
r o u nd  of p re s c r ip t ion s  f o r  ways  and means .  Th is is b e c o m in g  a semi­
d ec e nn ia l  exe rc ise  - fes t iva l  h a rd ly  seems an a p p r o p r ia t e  t e r m  - beg in n ing  in 
1979-81, repea ted  in 1984-86 and now  aga in  o v e r  1989-91.  The most 
f a v o u ra b le  ve rd ic ts  on the f i rs t  two exerc ises  a re  tha t  t he y  shed  some light 
on som e  p ro b le m s ,  p ro p o s e d  g rab -ba gs  of p i l ls  (som e  a p p ro p r ia t e ,  and some 
ak in to b le e d in g  m a la r ia  pat ients)  and ,  poss ib ly ,  p re v e n te d  a w id e s p r e a d  ca­
t as t rop h e  f ro m  b e c o m in g  a genera l  ca tac lysm .  The sense  of de ja  vu and the 
sce p t ic i sm s  - fo r  va ry in g  reasons  - as to the va lu e ,  e i t h e r  of  the  rev iews or 
of the  s t ra teg ie s  they  evoked ,  are d e p re s s in g l y  w id e s p r e a d .
In 1979 the  A f r i can  States w e re  (odd ly ,  as t he y  w e r e  at the  end  of the i r  best 
ave rag e  GDP g ro w th  per iod )  co nce rn e d  that  g ro w th  w a s  too  s lo w  and (with 
m o re  ins igh t )  that it was  n e i the r  b ec o m in g  m o r e  s e l f - su s ta in in g  no r  t rans ­
f o r m in g  e i the r  p ro d u c t io n  and t rade  o r  p o v e r ty  leve ls .  The sub-Saharan  
A f r i can  (SSA) m e m b e rs  of the W o r ld  Bank  asked  f o r  a s tu d y  on h ow  to over ­
co m e  these  l im i ta t ions .  The 1981 Berg  R e por t  (A c c e l e r a t e d  D e ve lo p m e n t )  
r a th e r  in accu ra te ly  w ro te  off the  w h o le  of the  1970s as an e c o n o m ic  fai lure 
and  c o r re c t l y  (if on ly  par t ia l l y  fo r  the  r igh t  reasons )  f o recas t  in c re a s in g  pres­
su res  in the  1980s. Its p re s c r ip t io n s  fo r  cu r in g  the  w e a k n e s s e s  it perceived 
w e re  s o m e w h a t  ec lect ic ,  but  the  cu t t ing  e dg e  was  l i b e ra l i s a t io n  of t rade 
l inked  to re d u c t io n  of s tate c o n s u m p t io n  in a con tex t  of a g e n e ra l  f reeing of 
m a rke ts  d o m es t ica l l y ,  p lus a d o u b l i n g  of f o re ig n  a id e x te rn a l l y .
By the  m id -1980s  it was e v iden t  that  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  l i b e ra l i sa t ion  plus 
IMF-s ty le  d e m a n d  c o m p re s s io n  were ,  by th e m s e lv e s ,  u n a c c e p ta b le  to many 
A f r i ca n  States, w e re  f re q u e n t ly  u nsu s ta ina b le  w h e n  t r ie d  a nd  d id  not  lead to 
subs tan t ia l  s t ruc tu ra l  a d ju s tm e n t  and a cce le ra te d  g ro w th  on the  supp ly  side.
Fur the r ,  the w o r ld  e con om ic  e n v i ro n m e n t  - in respect  to te rm s  of t rade,  
a v a i la b i l i t y  of co m m e rc ia l  and expor t  cred i t  and aid f lows - was e vo lv ing  in 
a v e ry  u n fa vou rab le  way and c o n t ra ry  to the Bank 's  1981 pro jec t ions .  The 
A f r i c a n  in i t ia t ive  e m b od ie d  in APPER and la rge ly  end o rse d  by the UN as 
U N P A A E R D  at the Specia l  Sess ion  of the  Genera l  A s s e m b ly  in 1986, sought  
to st r i ke  a barga in :  inc reased A f r i can  e f f i c iency in resource  use (wi th a ra the r  
m o re  va r ie d  set of tools  than the in it ia l  Bank  m ode l ,  but  one that  the Bank,  
by 1986, was at least w i l l i ng  to co n s id e r  in speci f ic  cases) in re turn  fo r  a 
subs tan t ia l  increase in soft resou rce  t rans fe rs  and s ign i f ican t  debt  serv ice  
re l ie f .
By the  end of the 1980s the  fa i lu re  of the s t ra tegy  was c lear  - o r  though t  to 
be c lear .  First,  the dec l ine  in GDP per  capi ta had. at best, been hal ted but 
at a p r i ce  in auster i ty  and effort  that  left A f r ican  'a d jus tm e n t  fa t igue '  face to 
face w i th  ex te rna l  'a id fa t igue' .  A bso lu te  p ove r ty  had w o rse ne d .  Wh i le  the 
B a n k  and  some Af r ican States had in teg ra ted  hum an  in ves tm en t /bas ic  se r ­
v ices  and  abso lu te  poverty  r e d u c t i o n /p ro d u c t i o n  by p oo r  peop le ,  into the i r  
s t ra teg ic  app roaches ,  a r t i cu la t ion  p e r fo rm an ce  lagged.  Second,  resource  
t ra n s fe rs  and inc reased expo r t  earn ings ,  p lus debt  wr i te-of fs ,  had not, on 
ave rag e ,  a l lowed  s igni f icant  res to ra t io n  of im po r ts .  Th i rd ,  rev ised  es t ima tes 
of re s o u rc e  needs  (not least  in the B ank 's  1989 L o n g -T e rm  P e rspec t ive  
S t u d y ) show ed  a need to dou b le  average  real pe r  capi ta state spend ing  in the 
p oo re s t  s tates (and boost  it at least a q u a r te r  on average),  to create an 
e n a b l in g /s u s ta in in g  c l imate  fo r  en te rp r ise  - and  house ho ld - le d ,  p ro duc t io n  
g ro w th .  At  the same, t im e  state b u dg e ta ry  and  nat ional  sav ing  cons t ra in ts  
w e re  - wi th  a few excep t ions  - sh ow ing  l i t t le s igns of s ign i f i cant  loosen ing.  
Four th ,  the  bank rup tcy  of an expor t  s t ra tegy  based on m o re  of the same had 
b e c o m e  c lea r  (not least in the  Cote d ' l v o i re -G h a n a  sm ash ing  of the wo r ld  
cocoa  m a rke t  and re duc t io n  of th e i r  own expo r t  rece ip ts  by a near  d oub l in g  
of p r o d u c t i o n  ove r  1983-90). On the o the r  hand,  no a l te rna t ive  had been d e ­
s ig n e d  (no r  even ser ious ly  sought ,  w h e th e r  by the Bank,  UNCTAD o r  more  
than  th ree  o r  fou r  SSA gove rnm en ts ) .
On the  UNPAAER D 'b a rg a in '  w h a te v e r  the d ive rge n ce s  in deta i l ,  a n u m b e r  
of the  key ac to rs  and agenc ies  (somewhat  d isc ree t ly )  and in d ep e n d e n t  c o m ­
m e n ta to rs  (somewhat  m ore  robus t ly )  agree  that :
•  Mos t  SSA go ve rn m e n ts  d id  unde r take  subs tant ia l  e con om ic  re fo rm  and 
a d ju s tm e n t  p ro g r a m m e s  often at ve ry  h igh  social  and pol i t ica l ,  as well  
as e conom ic ,  cost. The A f r ican  s ide  of the barga in  was - in many cases 
- kept ;
•  Real ,  net, soft resource  t rans fe rs  per  capi ta fel l f rom 1984 th rou g h  1990. 
Debt  reschedu l ing /w r i te -o f fs ,  by and large,  p reven ted  ava lanches  of open 
de fau l ts  and im por t  i n te r rup t io ns  ra the r  than  reduc ing  o ve rh a n g s  o r  a l ­
lo w in g  se r ious  fo rw a rd  f inanc ia l  p la nn in g  f ree f rom the cons t ra in ts  of
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debt  b u rden s .  These bu rdens ,  at best , c r ip p le d  pu b l i c  se rv ices  and 
in f ras t ruc tu ra l  m a in te n a n c e / in v es tm e n t  and ,  at w o rs t ,  p osed  cho ices as 
stark as se rv ic ing  deb t  o r  f inanc ing  basic food  s e cu r i t y  a nd  m ed ica l  ser­
v ices.  M w a l im u  N ye re re 's  ques t ion  as to w h e th e r  SSA States should 
se rv ice  ex te rna l  deb t  at the cost  of s ta rv ing  c h i ld re n  was  rhe to r i ca l .  But 
it r e m a in e d  rhe to r i ca l  on ly  because no A f r i can  State (except  perhaps,  
f lee t ing ly ,  Ma law i)  chose  to pay at such a pr ice.  Ful l  d eb t  se rv ice  was. 
and  rem a ins ,  co m p a t ib le  w i th  e con o m ic  and  h u m a n  su rv iv a l  in a m ino r i t y  
of  SSA co un t r ies  only.  On balance,  the tota l  debt ,  a r r e a r s  and  average 
level  of deb t  d is t ress  have r isen;
•  the  ex te rna l  e con om ic  e n v i ro n m e n t  behaved  m u ch  w o r s e  tha n  pro jected,  
w i th  t e rm s  of t rade  losses excee d in g  net i n w a rd  real  re s o u r c e  t ransfers 
p lus  deb t  w r i te -d o w n s .  C ou n t ing  these t r a d e  ga ins ,  N o r t h e r n  industr ia l  
e c o n o m ie s  were  the  rec ip ien ts  of net re s o u rc e  f lo ws  f r o m  A f r ic a  not (as 
p r e s u m a b ly  env isaged  in UNPAAERD) the  o th e r  w a y  a ro u n d .
Very  c lea r ly ,  the 1991 rev iew  of UNPAAER D wi l l  be m a rk e d  by vo ice s  (and 
not  on ly  A f r i ca n  vo ices)  saying:  A f r ica  h o n o u r e d  the con t rac t ,  the  North de ­
fau l ted .  The of f icial  N o r th e rn  p e rcep t ion  is ve ry  d i f fe ren t ;  it t e n d s  to s idestep 
the  d is a s t ro u s  marke t  d e v e lo p m e n ts  and (wi th l im i ted  c re d ib i l i t y )  c la im that 
A f r i can  c o r ru p t i o n  and bad g o v e rn a n c e  w e re  the  bas ic  co n s t ra in t s  on aid 
f lows  and  cons t i tu te  A f r ican  n on -c o m p l ia n c e  w i th  U N P A A E R D .  H o w e v e r  t rue 
e i the r  case may  be (or  indeed  e lements  of each - no i n d e p e n d e n t  analyst  
cou ld  m ake  m uch  of a de fence  fo r  som e  A f r i ca n  States,  o r  the  pol ic ies  of 
others ,  any  m o re  than  of the actual  o pe ra t io n s  of  m a n y  te c h n ic a l  'ass istance 
and aid p ro g r a m m e s ) ,  they  are not a usefu l  s ta r t ing  po in t  f o r  s e r io us  nego t i ­
at ion.  A d ia lo g u e  (or para l l e l  d ia t r ibes)  ca r r ie d  out  on th o s e  bases  can only 
lead to tears .  If the  pu rpo se  of u n d e rs ta n d in g  the  past  is to a v o id  repeat ing 
it, ca nd id  accep tance  that the re  is m o re  than  e n o u g h  b la m e  f o r  all to share, 
co up le d  w i th  se r ious  a t tem p ts  to a l t e r  the fu tu re ,  m igh t  be m o r e  p roduc t ive .
That  c o n c lu s io n  is pe rhaps  a t r i u m p h  of hope o v e r  e x p e r ie n c e ,  but  1991 has 
som e  th in g s  go ing  fo r  A f r ica  that  1981 did  not . Far  f e w e r  e c o n o m ie s  are in. 
o r  en te r in g ,  f ree  fal l .  The two ma in  reg iona l  w a r  c lu s te rs  - S o u th e rn  Africa 
and  the  Ho rn  - seem to be m o v in g  to w a rd  le sse n in g  leve ls  of  v io le nce ,  with 
re d u c t io n s  in e c on o m ic  and  h um an  loss.  Debt  w r i te -o f fs  of  a d e q u a te  scope 
and  m a g n i tu d e  - fo l l o w in g  the Pol ish and Egyp t ia n  p re c e d e n ts ,  as wel l  as the 
Costa  Rican 'B r a d y  P lan '  e x am p le  - are,  a p p a re n t l y ,  a bo u t  to c o m e  onto the 
ne g o t ia t in g  agenda .
Perhaps  m os t  crucia l ,  t he re  is a fa i r l y  b road  a rea  of g e n e ra l  a g re e m e n t  on 
m e d iu m - te r m  s t ra teg ic  po l icy  and p r o g r a m m e  c o m p o n e n ts  f o r  e con o m ic  re­
hab i l i ta t ion  and  t r a ns fo rm a t io n ,  even if d i v e rg e n c e s  in de ta i l  a nd  p r io r i t y  still 
va ry .  Equa l l y  s ign i f ican t ,  the  a reas  of lesser c o n s e n s u s  - p o v e r t y  reduc t ion
-  3 -
and  e xpo r t  d e v e lop m en t  - have becom e  areas of mutua l  uncer ta in ty  ra the r  
than  h a rd l i ne  N o r th e rn /A f r i ca n  con f ron ta t ion .
That  th is  p ro to base  for  agreed  ac t ion  is less c lea r  than  it m ight  be is an u n ­
fo r tun a te  resul t  of stat ic rhe to r i c  m ask in g  ra p id ly  sh i f t ing real i ty.  In the 
Ban k  s L o n g -T e rm  P e rspec t ive  S tudy  (LTPS)  a g loss of hard l i ne ,  neo- l ibe ra l  
rh e to r i ca l  gene ra l i sa t ions  bears  l i t t le re la t ion  to its p ragmat ic ,  ca re fu l ly  
s t ru c tu re d ,  socia l ly  re sp ons ive  p ro p o s a ls  (wh ich  could  well  be te rm ed  
soc ia l -democrat ic ,  if the B ank  d a red  a do p t  that  label) .  S im i la r ly ,  the UN Eco­
no m ic  C o m m is s io n  for  A f r i ca 's  A f r ican  A l t e r n a t i v e s  S tudy  com b ine s  st ra teg ic 
and  p o l i cy  p roposa ls ,  wh ich  are  9 5%  c o n g ru e n t  wi th  LTPS,  wi th  a susta ined 
d e n u n c ia t io n  of u l t ra -d e m a n d - re du c t io n is t ,  a rche typa l ,  1960s-style Fund 
s tab i l i sa t io n  p ro g ra m m e s  wh ich  it app a re n t ly  be l ieves  are p resen t  Bank p o l ­
icy.
Debate  is needed ,  as is a t ten t ion  to actual  - not  m ere ly  ve rba l  - export  d e ­
v e lo p m e n t  and poverty  red uc t ion  s t ra teg ies  and  the i r  a r t icu la t io n  and im p le ­
m en ta t ion .  Rheto r i c  that  d is g u ise s  a reas  of a g reem e n t  is, in the Bank 's  
t e r m in o lo g y ,  ineff icient  because  it m isa l loca tes  inte l lec tua l  re sources  f rom 
b u i ld in g  on what  is agreed,  deba t ing  genu in e  po in ts of d i f fe rence  and id e n t i ­
fy in g  and  f i l l ing  gaps.
F i f teen  Yea rs  - Large ly  Wasted?
S ince 1975. A f r ica  has passed th r o u g h  th ree  m a in  e con om ic  per iods :
(1) 1975-79 was charac te r ised  by rap id  re co ve ry  of the m a jo r i t y  of A fr i can 
e c o n o m ie s  f rom  the 1974 d ro u g h t / f i r s t  oil sh ock - ind uced  dec l ines .  O ver  
1976-79, fo u r  years of 5 %  a ve rag e  GDP g ro w th  were  the h ighest  m u l t i ­
y e a r  pe r iod  ever re co rd e d  and ,  un ique ly ,  were  ro ugh ly  c o m p a rab le  to 
the  S ou th 's  g lobal  average .  In re t rospec t  it is c lear  that  th is  g row th  was 
o v e r l y  depende n t  on the p roceed s  of the 1975-76 beverage  pr ice  boom, 
on oi l  expo r t  earnings,  and on a rap id  b u i ld -up  of ex te rna l  debt .  Fur ther ,  
even  at a t im e  of re la t ive  lack of severe  re so u rce  cons t ra in ts ,  ne i the r  ef ­
f i c ie n cy  im p ro ve m en t ,  c u r re n c y  re a l ig n m e n t  no r  long- te rm  e xpo r t  d i v e r ­
s i f ica t ion  st ra teg ies we re  ac ted upon.  Even at the t ime,  m o re o ve r ,  it was 
c le a r  that  the averages  masked  ve ry  p o o r  p e r fo rm ances  by several  
e c o n o m ie s ,  inc lud ing  Ghana,  Za ire  and Ethiopia.
(2) 1980-84 was a per iod  of near ly  un i fo rm  e c o n o m ic  d isas ter .  The only 
c lea r -cu t  except ions  w e re  B o tsw ana  and Maur i t iu s .  These two ex ­
ce p t io n s  do inc lude  f iscal  p ru d e n c e  and e xpo r t  buoyancy ,  but  the specia l  
d ia m o n d /E E C  beef  and EEC-or iented expo r t  m anu fac tu r ing  zone  - wh ich  
co ns t i tu te  the respec t ive  expo r t  bases of Bo tswana  and M au r i t iu s  - are 
so spec ia l  as to make genera l  e m u la t ion  im prac t icab le .  The second oil
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shock,  sha rp  inc reases  in w o r ld  in te rest  rates,  gene ra l  p r im a r y  product  
t e rm s  of  t ra de  d e te r io ra t ion ,  d ro ug h t  and  w a r  w e re  a m o n g  the main 
causes  of the debac le  e x p e r ie n c ed  by mos t  A f r i can  e c o n o m ie s .  These 
in te rac ted  w i th  State pe rsonn e l  and  f inanc ia l  capa c i t ie s  w h ic h  had nar­
ro w  m a rg in s  to h and le  inc reased s t ra in s  and  w h o s e  e f f ic iency  de te r i ­
o ra ted  ra d ica l l y  u n d e r  repea ted  shocks.  Fu r the r ,  o v e r  1980-82, most  
A f r i c a n  po l ic y  make rs  (l ike the  IMF, the  W o r ld  B a n k  and  the  OECD) as­
s u m e d  rap id  g loba l  recove ry  in 1981-82 or,  at the latest ,  1982-83. There ­
fo re  they  t r ied  to repea t  the ' r i d i n g  out  the  s to r m '  tac t ics  tha t  had served 
th e m  wel l  o v e r  1974-76. When,  ins tead,  the  ex te rna l  con tex t  cont inued  
to w o rs e n ,  they  faced the need fo r  m o re  rad ica l  cu ts in im p o r ts  and 
p ub l ic  in v e s tm e n t /s e rv i c e s  w i th  m u ch  h ig h e r  ex te rna l  deb t ,  m o re  accrued  
u n d e r -m a in te n a n c e  and l i t t le re m a in in g  less -essen t ia l  s p e n d in g  to cut. 
than  if a d ju s tm e n t  had been begun  in 1979-80.
The f i rst  hal f  of the 1980s was  also m a rked  by a d r o u g h t  cycle  cu lm in a t ­
ing in 1984. Whi le  d ro u g h ts  are  e n d e m ic  in A f r ica ,  the  pa ra l le l  t im in g  and 
seve r i t y  in the  Sahel,  the Horn  and S o u th e rn  A f r ic a  w e re  ex t rem e.  Also 
in the  Horn ,  Sou the rn  and South A f r i ca  the  1980-89 cos ts  of w a r  have 
p r o b a b ly  been of the  o r d e r  of $100 b i l l i on  and  m a d e  the  d i f fe rence  be­
tw een  ac tua l  2 %  and potent ia l  5 -6 %  a nnu a l  g ro w th  ra tes .  Un l ike the 
d r o u g h t  cycle,  th is  b u rde n  did not  ' co m e  r ig h t '  in the  s econ d  hal f  of the 
decad e ,  a l t ho u gh  som e aba tem en t  was a ch ie ve d  in S o u th e rn  A f r ica  after 
1988 and  is now in p rospec t  in the Horn .
(3) 1985-90  has aga in  been m o re  m ixed .  The 1976-79 5 %  g ro w th  rates of 
GDP have not  been re g a in e d ,  but  the 1 .5 -2% of 1980-84 have  been in­
c rea sed  to about  a 3 %  t rend ,  a lbei t  w i th  w id e  a nnua l ,  s u b - re g io n a l  and 
na t iona l  f lu c tua t ions .  W h e th e r  th is  p e r fo rm a n c e  c o ns t i tu te s  a base for  
s us ta ine d  recove ry  and  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  is at best  u nc lea r .  Wi th  1990 GDP 
pe r  capi ta  f reque n t ly  es t ima ted  at 20 -25%  b e lo w  1980, re c o v e r y  has a 
long  w ay  to go and even  'success fu l  a d j u s to r s '  w i th  3 -5 %  GDP trend 
g ro w th  s ince the m id -1980s  of ten face a p ro jec te d  t re n d  da te  of  2000-2020 
fo r  re g a in in g  the i r  1980 pos i t i ons .  C le a r ly  a d ju s tm e n t  fa t ig ue  wi l l  force 
po l ic y  chan ges  - fo r  be t te r  o r  fo r  w o rse  - we l l  be fo re  tha t  date .  C o m p e t ­
i t ive e lec t ions ,  h o w e v e r  des i rab le ,  wi l l  i n c re a se  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a re­
v e rs io n  to u nd u ly  o p t im is t i c  po l ic y  and  s p e n d in g  p a t te rns ,  no tab ly  in 
Ghana  and Zamb ia .
A la r m in g ly ,  the  l o n g e r  runn ing ,  m o re  success fu l ,  in te rna t io n a l l y -ba cke d  
s t ruc tu ra l  a d ju s tm e n t  p r o g r a m m e s  sh o w  no s ign  of  a c h ie v in g  ex te rna l  ac­
coun t  sus ta in ab i l i t y ,  if that  is de f ined  as a s ig n i f i can t  r e d u c t i o n  in real per 
capi ta im p o r t s  cons is ten t  w i th  c o n t in ued  o u tp u t  and  in v e s tm e n t  growth.  
Ghana and Tanzan ia  have rega in ed  g row th  t r e n d s  a b o v e  tha t  of popu la t ion ,  
n a r ro w e d  (c losed in G ha na 's  case) re cu r ren t  b u d g e t  de f ic i ts  and  reduced 
g o v e rn m e n t  use of do m e s t ic  bank in g  sys tem f in ance  to m a n a g e a b le  levels.
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They have hal ted the d e te r io ra t io n  in hea l th -e du ca t ion -w a te r  p rov is ion  and 
have  m ad e  p rogress  at in f ras truc tu ra l  res to ra t ion .  But, desp i te  deva lu a t ion  
and  o th e r  expor t  enab l ing  m ea su res  wh ic h  have indeed led to s igni f icant  ex ­
por t  v o lu m e  growth ,  the i r  ex te rna l  resource  t rans fe r  in f low re qu i rem en ts  
have r isen  and - even on Bank  p ro jec t ions  - wi l l  cont inue  to do so fo r  the 
fo re s e e a b le  fu tu re  if f iscal balance,  se rv ices  res to ra t ion  and 5 %  g row th  are 
to be sus ta ined .  Te rms of t ra de  dec l ine  and the ini t ial  t rade  gap have meant  
that  ea rned  im por t  capaci ty  as a share  of cu r ren t  pr ice GDP has fa l len even 
t h o u g h  expo r ts  as a share of cons tant  pr ice  GDP have r isen. Only M aur i t iu s  
of the  ex te rn a l l y  backed,  and  Z im b a b w e  of the fu l ly  d om es t ica l l y  craf ted 
SAPs,  have ach ieved  rea son ab ly  sus ta inab le  cu rren t  accoun t  balances.  
M a u r i t i u s '  expo r t  indus tr ia l  zones have cap i ta l i sed  on re la t ive ly  h igh labou r  
t ra in in g  and  p roduc t iv i t y  w h i le  Z im b a b w e  has bui l t  up manu fac tu res  exports 
(espec ia l l y  reg iona l l y )  and an a r ray  of o ld and  new (e.g. m ange- tou t  peas) 
p r im a r y  exports .
D o m e s t i c  sav ing  has also been s low to re c o v e r  - no tab ly  in Z im babw e,  as 
we l l  as in Ghana and Tanzan ia .  In part,  th is  is a resul t  of s low export  g rowth  
- if r e c u r re n t  im por ts  equal  o r  exceed expo r ts  then  only the dom es t ic  content  
(usua l l y  30-50%) of f ixed inves tm en t  can,  ex p o s t , be f inanced f rom dom es t ic  
sav ings .  In the Ghana and Z im b a b w e  cases,  the resul t  has been low 
re c o rd e d  Domes t ic  Fixed Capi ta l  Fo rm a t io n  (bare ly  above  the 9-12% of GDP 
ran ge  fo r  dep rec ia t ion  wh ich  shou ld  be, but  ra re ly  is, a l lowed  for  in nat ional  
accoun ts )  and a rise in overa l l  capac i ty  u t i l i sa t ion  f rom  perhaps  7 5%  in 1983 
to o v e r  9 0 %  by 1990. Tanzan ia ,  p e r  contra ,  has m a in ta ined  high (over  20%  
of GDP) f ixed  inves tment  levels,  but a pp a re n t l y  wi th l i t t le overal l  gain in 
capa c i ty  u t i l isa t ion .
The 1980s were  charac te r ised  not  s im p ly  by s lo w  GDP g row th  but  also by in ­
c rea ses  in the p ropo r t ion  of A f r icans  l iv ing in abso lu te  pove r ty  to a round  
3 0 %  (v i r tua l l y  ty ing  wi th South  As ia fo r  the h ighes t  p ro po r t io n  in the wor ld ) ,  
r i s ing  food  insecur i ty  at both hou se ho ld  and nat ional  levels,  dec reas ing  ac­
cess to a d eq ua te  l i ve l ihoods  (in e m p lo y m e n t  o r  se l f -emp loym ent ) ,  low to 
n eg a t i v e  en te rp r ise  sector  la b o u r  p ro d u c t iv i t y  g rowth ,  acce le ra t ing  eco log ica l  
d a m a g e  (soi l  e ros ion,  de fo res ta t ion ,  neo-deser t i f i ca t ion) ,  near s tagnat ion  in 
u nd e r -5  m o r ta l i t y  rates and of l ife expec tanc ies  at b i r th ( respec t i ve ly  the 
h ig he s t  and  lowest  of al l  reg ions)  and ,  la rge ly  as a resul t  of im p o v e r i s h m e n t  
and  in secu r i ty ,  r is ing popu la t ion  g row th  rates.
B r ie f  o v e n / ie w s  of Afr ica must  be t rea ted  w i th  caut ion.  F i f ty-two count r ies  
w i th  o v e r  500 mi l l i on  peop le  (47 wi th o v e r  400 m i l l i on  e xc lu d ing  North Afr ica,  
o r  53 w i th  550 m i l l ion  in c lud ing  North  and also South Afr ica)  cannot  be 
re a d i l y  h om og e n ise d  into m ean ing fu l  a v e rag es  o r  s im p le  qua l i ta t ive  d e ­
s c r ip t io n s  and  ana lyses.  However ,  most  of the  d i f fe rences are in ter -count ry :  
No r th  A f r i can  pe r fo rm ance  (despi te  h ig h e r  GDP per capi ta e con om ic  s t ruc ­
tu res )  is not  rad ica l ly  d i f fe rent  f rom  that of m id d le - in c o m e  sub-Saharan
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A f r ican  e c on om ies .  South  Afr ica ,  because of a pa r th e id ,  has a rad ical ly  
d i f feren t  in com e  d is t r ib u t io n ,  a lbei t  one r e m a rk a b l y  c o m p a r a b le  to Brazi l  
a m o n g  la rge,  in d u s t r ia l i sed ,  m id d le - i n c o m e  e c o n o m ie s .  It a lso has an 
in d u s t r ia l l y  focused  s t ruc tu re  of p ro du c t io n .  H ow e ve r ,  its 1980-90 and (es­
pec ia l l y )  1985-90, e c o n o m ic  p e r fo rm an ce  has been m o d e r a te l y  w o rs e  than 
that  of SSA. B u re a u c ra t i c  con t ro ls ,  se l f - in f l ic ted  d a m a g e  f r o m  luxu ry  con­
sum p t ion ,  ' n a t i o n a l l y '  chosen  high leve ls of m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i tu re ,  market  
co ns t ra in ts  f lo w ing  f ro m  the  ap a r th e id  in co m e  d is t r i b u t io n  s t ru c tu re  and low 
la b o u r  p ro d u c t i v i t y  d i re c t l y  f low ing  f rom  the w o rk p la c e  re la t io n s  s t ruc tu re  of 
a p a r th e id  have led to this.
A n o th e r  se r ious  obs tac le  fo r  e i the r  nat iona l  o r  re g ion a l  s u rv e y s  is that  SSA 
data are  v e ry  bad.  Es t imates of GDP are  ra re ly  be t te r  than  p lus  o r  minus 
2 0 %  and,  even m o re  se r ious ,  those of GDP g ro w th  are sub jec t  to p lus or  m i ­
nus 2 %  m o re  and,  fo r  pop u la t io n  g rowth ,  p lus o r  m in u s  1 % .  At  p resent .  GDP 
g ro w th  is - on a ve rage  - p ro b a b ly  m a rg in a l l y  u n d e r -e s t im a te d  (g ross ly  so 
w h en  US d o l l a r  c o n v e rs io n s  are used because  of m ass ive ,  pos t-1983 real 
de v a lu a t i o n s  in a m a jo r i t y  of coun t r ies) .  P o p u la t i o n  g ro w th  o ve r -e s t im a t io ns  
are c o m m o n  (e.g. the 1987 Tanzan ia  census  sh o w s  a 2 .7 5 %  popu la t ion  
g ro w th  rate o v e r  1977-87 ve rsus  the 3 .3%  e s t im a te d  f ro m  c a re less  c o m p a r ­
ison of the  n o n -c o m p a ra b le  1967 and 1977 cens i) .  H o w e v e r ,  the  b road  pa­
ra m e te rs  are  v is ib le  desp i te  the unce r ta in t ies  and  the ac tua l  p os i t i on  is gr im 
fo r  a m a jo r i t y  of A f r icans ,  even if s l i gh t ly  less so than  the  a v a i la b le  data  might  
sugges t .
The late 1980s has seen a b ro a d e n in g  area of s t ra teg ic  and  p o l i c y  agreement.  
Fo r  exam p le ,  g ro ss ly  ove r -va lu e d  cu r re n c ie s  have  few b a cke rs  and  nei ther  
do shor t ,  sh a rp  shock  s tab i l i sa t ion  sch em es  w i th  no a t te n t ion  to real  house ­
ho ld  incom e  o r  basic ( re -s ty led  'h u m a n  in v e s tm e n t ' )  s e rv ice s  consequences .  
The UN E cono m ic  C o m m is s io n  fo r  A f r i ca 's  A f r i c a n  A l t e r n a t i v e  F r a m e w o r k  to 
S t r u c tu r a l  A d j u s t m e n t  P r o g r a m m e s  (AA F-S A P)  is 9 5 %  c o m p a t ib le  wi th the 
W o r ld  B an k 's  L o n g -T e rm  P e rs p e c t i v e  S tu d y  - F ro m  Cr is is  to Sus ta inab le  
G ro w th .  R ed uc t io n  of  abso lu te  po ve r ty  has r e tu r n e d  to the  W o r ld  Bank's 
s t ra teg ic  p r i o r i t y  a ge n da  both in the  LTPS  and  in the  1990 W o r ld  D e v e lo p ­
m e n t  Repor t ,  and en te red  the  ECA's  w i th  the  K h a r t o u m  H u m a n  D im ens ion  
C o n fe re n ce  in 1988 and its Dec la ra t ion ,  s u b s e q u e n t l y  b lessed  by OAU and 
ECA su m m i ts .  W h i le  th e re  rem a in  sh a rp  d is a g r e e m e n ts  on p ha s in g ,  t iming,  
re la t ive  p r io r i t ie s  and  t rade-o f fs ,  the  b ro ad  b o d y  of s t ra te g ic  a na lys is  has 
m o v e d  fa r  away,  both f ro m  the n e o - l i be ra l i sm  of  the  B a n k 's  1981 B e rg  Report  
and  the M a rx ia n -p h r a s e d  (and less f re q u e n t l y  s u b s ta n t i v e ly  in te n d e d )  neo­
m erca n t i l i s t  p la t fo rm s  held  by m an y  A f r ican  g o v e r n m e n ts  at tha t  date.
There  are  two  bas ic gaps.  However ,  these  are  c o m m o n  to,  ra th e r  than  points 
of c o n f ro n ta t io n  a m o n g ,  the  s tud ies.  Both  A A F -S A P  and  LTPS are st rate­
g ica l l y  c o m m i t te d  to p o ve r ty  red uc t ion  and bo th  have m o v e d  beyond  the 
ra the r  s te r i le  deba te  on the  d eg ree  to wh ich  SAPs  have ,  o r  h ave  not  con t r ib ­
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uted  to wavs  and  means of re duc ing  pove r ty  levels.  However ,  ne i the r  real ly  
a r t i cu la te s  how to enab le  p o o r  h ou se h o ld s  (w he the r  as fa rmers ,  a r t isans  or 
w a g e d  em p loyees)  to p ro du c e  m o re  o r  how  to fit cr i te r ia  fo r  ach iev ing  that  
end  into  ove ra l l  macro ,  sec to ra l  and p ro jec t  se lec t ion  opera t ions .  Nor  does  
e i t h e r  s tudy ,  in fact, have a coheren t ,  c re d ib le  expor t  d eve lo p m en t  st rategy.
It is c o nve n ie n t  to look at A f r i ca  in 1989-90 and  its 1991-2000 p rospec ts  in a 
f r a m e w o r k  of fo u r  issue c lusters:
(1) Pub l i c  Sec to r  Capac i ty :  Secur i ty ,  G o v e rn a n c e ,  Par t ic ipat ion
F o r  those  A fr ican coun t r ies  af f l ic ted,  war,  o r  the l ive th rea t  o f  war,  is the  
g r e a t e s t  s ing le  b a r r i e r  to g ro w th ,  d e v e lo p m e n t  and  p o v e r t y  reduc t io n .  
In the  case of Sou thern  A fr i ca ,  in c lu d ing  Namib ia ,  the 1980-89 d i rect  and 
in d i re c t  GDP losses f ro m  w a r  to ta l led  $65,000 mi l l ion,  o r  o ve r  twice a t ­
t a ine d  GDP (as wel l  as nea r ly  1.600,000 l ives) .  Since Sou the rn  Af r ica has 
a l r e a d y  ten uou s ly  rega in ed  a 3 .5-4% g ro w th  t rend ,  the potent ia l  peace 
d i v id e n d  could be a 6 %  annua l  g ro w th  rate.
In the  case of South Afr i ca ,  w a r  costs have been substant ia l  - the ' d e ­
fence '  budget  has both led to in f la t iona ry  f inance  and to the 'c ro w d in g  
ou t '  of pub l ic  secto r  h u m an  and  physica l  inves tm en t  and main tenance .  
H o w e v e r ,  the wa r  bil l  in th is  case is on ly  one facet  of the cost  of 
apar the id .  For a lmost  40 years South  A f r i c a 's  h igh capi ta l is ts  (not least 
the  le ade rs  of A ng lo -d e  Beers  and R e m b ra nd t )  have w arned  that  the 
sys tem  was econo m ica l ly  ineff ic ient .  The cost of p ropp ing  up the
B an tu s tan s  and internal  's ecu r i t y '  has been the most  ev iden t ,  but by no 
m e a ns  the largest ,  i tem. H igh ly  unequa l  d is t r ib u t io n  of p u rchas in g  p ow er  
(p lus go ld -based ,  Dutch d isease  s y n d r o m e  de te r r ing  manu fac tu red  
e x p o r t  deve lo pm en t )  have d is to r te d  and  l im i ted  indus t r ia l  g rowth .  
P erha ps  most  ser ious ,  the  la b o u r  re la t ions  of apar the id  are such that  
d o u b l i n g  b lack wages  in the 1980s a c h ieved  zero o r  negat ive  g rowth  in 
l a b o u r  p roduc t iv i t y  - a v i r tu a l l y  u n p re c e de n te d  'a ch ievem e n t ' .  This 
he r i tag e  shou ld  g ive g ro u n d s  fo r  paus ing  before  accep t ing  c la ims that  a 
' n e w '  South  Afr ica (apparen t l y  u n d e r  the sam e p rodu c t ion  and en te rp r ise  
m a n a g e rs )  wi l l  become the  lo co m o t ive  to haul  SSA out  of s tagnat ion .
O n ly  the Sou thern  A f r ican  costs have been es t imated ser ious ly .  Because  
th e y  f low  p r im a r i l y  f rom  exte rna l  a gg re s s io n  and the ma in  state f inanc ie r  
a nd  m a n a g e r  of that a g g re ss ion  is South  Afr ica ,  it has been (just) p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  poss ib le  for  in te rna t io na l  o rg a n iza t io n s  to study the m  se r ious ly  
a nd  to use the i r  f in d ings  as inputs  into po l ic y  d ia logue.  But  the costs of 
in te r lo c k ing  civi l ,  e m p i re  b reak  up (in the c lassic mean ing  of emp ire )  and 
b o r d e r  wa rs  in the Horn  (Sudan,  E th iop ia /E r i t rea ,  Somal ia ,  Dj ibou t i )  over  
the  last  decade  have p ro ba b ly  been in the  $20,000-25,000 m i l l i on  range 
o r  1.3-1.7 t im es  actual 1988 GDP, and they have had (because of fam ines
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r e n d e re d  m ass ive ly  fatal  by war)  a h ig h e r  dea th  tol l  than  in Sou thern  
A fr i ca .
Civ i l  w a rs  in L iber ia ,  Uganda ,  Za ire ,  the m ixe d  c ivi l  w a rs  w i th  external  
m a n ip u la t i o n  in Chad and Rwanda  and the l ib e ra t ion  s t ru g g le  in Western 
Sahara  have also c r ipp le d  the e co n o m ie s  af fected a nd  have  had a 
d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  dea th  tol l  of at least  15,000.000, a lbe i t  w i th  a lo w e r  GDP 
loss than  in e i the r  of the two core  w a r  zones .
W a r  - w h e n  fough t  w i th in  a na t io n 's  b o u n d a r ie s  - is the  e x t r e m e  of inse­
cu r i t y .  But  law and o rd e r ,  in the sense of be ing  ab le  to go abou t  one 's 
da i l y  l i v e l i h o o d  and life w i thou t  th reat ,  is weak  (in v a r y i n g  degrees)  in 
m a n y  n o n -w a r  States.  The e c ono m ic  costs of w ea k  law  and  o r d e r  and 
of c ivi l  d i s o r d e r  (w h a teve r  its causes) are  h igh.  S ec u r i t y  is not  a suf f i ­
c ient  c o n d i t i o n  fo r  d e v e lo p m e n t  but it is a n e ce ssa ry  one.
G o v e r n a n c e  is usua l ly  v iewed  as a pol i t ica l  issue but  se ve ra l  aspects are 
e c o n o m ic  o r  have d i rec t  e con o m ic  conse q ue n ce s .  F irs t,  it is id le  to talk 
a bou t  g oo d  g o v e rn a n c e  if State f inanc ia l  and  p e r s o n n e l  re sou rces  are 
in a d e q u a te  to the task o r  p oo r ly  d ep lo ye d .  The W o r ld  B a n k 's  LTPS  su g ­
ges ts  tha t  a f te r  e l im ina t in g  e n te rp r is e  s u b s id ie s  and  co n c e n t ra t in g  on 
basic se rv ice s  and in f ras truc tu re ,  SSA States wi l l  need to ra ise  p e r  capi ta  
e x p e n d i t u re  in real  te rm s  by 40-50% by 2000 (by o v e r  100% in the 
poo res t  coun t r ie s )  - and ,  imp l i c i t ly ,  to in c re ase  m id d le  and  high level 
pe rs o n n e l  by 25-30%. That  is such a d a u n t i n g  c h a l le n g e  as to requi re  
p r io r i t i s a t io n  away f ro m  non-essent ia l  se rv ices  and  f r o m  al l  but  selected, 
c ruc ia l  pub l i c  en te rp r ises ,  fo r  w h ich  p r iva te  o r  jo in t  v e n t u r e  a l terna t ives 
are  n on -e x is ten t  o r  c lea r ly  unsa t is fac to ry .  It is a case  not  f o r  less but for  
m o re  se le c t i ve  and d e e p e r  State reso u rce  d e p lo y m e n t .
Second ,  a ccou n ta b i l i t y  re qu i res  accounts .  A f r i ca n  p ub l ic  s e c to r  accounts 
usua l ly  ran ge  f rom weak  to d ep lo ra b le ,  es p e c ia l l y  in p r o v id i n g  the in­
te r im  in fo rm a t io n  f lows  n eeded  w i th in  a ( g o v e r n m e n t  o r  en te rp r is e )  f i ­
nanc ia l  y e a r  fo r  a dequa te  f inanc ia l  m a n a g e m e n t .  I ron ica l l y ,  and 
t ra g i c a l l y ,  d o n o r  p re ssu re  is f re q u e n t ly  a c c e le ra t in g  th i s  de te r io ra t io n .  
Scarce  p e rson ne l  are concen t ra ted  on h a n d l i n g  the  m u l t i p le  repor t ing  
p r o c e d u r e s  that  d o n o r s / l e n d e r s  requ ire ,  m a r g in a l i s i n g  a nd  deb i l i ta t ing  
the  na t iona l  b ud g e ta ry  accou n t ing  p rocess  as a resu l t .
Th i rd ,  p a r t i c ipa t ion  in g o v e rn a n c e  is l ike ly  (by p r o v id i n g  da ta  and m o n i ­
to r in g )  to inc rease  ef f ic iency of re source  use,  m o ra le  (and th e re fo re  p ro ­
duc t iv i ty )  and  the w i l l i n g n e s s  of c o m m u n i t ie s  to a u g m e n t  state  resources  
fo r  bas ic  se rv ices  and  sma l l - sca le  in f ra s t ruc tu re .  M u l t i - p a r t y i s m  is nei ­
t h e r  a su f f ic ien t  n o r  a necessa ry  co nd i t ion .  C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  of e lect ions,  
a real  chan ce  of de fea t ing  incum ben ts ,  c iv i l  soc ie ty  access  to enough 
a c c o u n t in g  repor ts  and o th e r  pub l ic  sec to r  in fo r m a t io n  to m ake  informed
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j u d g e m e n ts ,  and g ov e rn m e n ta l  re sp on s ivene ss  to publ ic  w ishes  and 
o p in io n s  are crucia l .  A s s u re d ly ,  most  s ing le ,  o r  no-par ty,  states shape 
up bad ly  on these counts,  but  the reco rd  of p resen t  and past m u l t i -pa r ty  
ones  in Af r ica is not  all that  much  bet ter.
(2) Sec to ra l  Bo t t lenecks  and  T ra n s fo rm a t io n  Needs
M a c ro -e c o n o m ic  st ra tegy  - espec ia l l y  w hen  concen t ra ted  on f iscal ,  m o n ­
e ta ry  and  exchange  rate po l i cy - is not enough .  Sectoral  s t ra teg ies  are 
a necessa ry  paral le l .  The fo u r  most  c ruc ia l  sec tors  are ag r ic u l tu re ,  
t ra n s p o r t  and co m m u n ica t io n s ,  m an u fac tu r ing  and energy.
A g r i c u l t u re  re m a in s  the key to a m a jo r i t y  of A f r i can  h ou se h o ld s '  
l i v e l i h o o d s  and food secur i t y ,  as wel l  as a m a jo r  source  of export  
e a rn in g s  and indus t r ia l  inputs .  Since 1965, its g ro w th  has lagged beh ind  
that  of popu la t ion .  The 1980s im p ro v e m e n t  to 2 .5% a year  seems to be 
m a d e  up of 2 %  food (ve rsus 2 -2 .5% o ve r  1965-70, 1.8% in the 1970s and 
s o m e w h a t  ove r  2 %  in the late 1960s) and 3 %  e x p o r t / in d u s t r ia l  c rops  
(versus  negat i ve  in the 1970s and ove r  3 %  in the late 1960s). For  su s ­
ta ined  re co very  and less inadequa te  nu t r i t i ona l  levels,  c om b ine d  wi th 
re d uc e d  d ep ende nce  on food a id,  4 %  g ro w th  of food p ro d u c t io n  is 
n ee ded  an n u a l ly  o ve r  1990-2010. For e xpo r t / i n d u s t r ia l  p roduc t ion ,  5 %  
g ro w th  is needed to avo id  co n t in ued  im p o r t  s t rangu la t ion  and m a n u fa c ­
tu r in g  b lockages,  a lbei t  on exports.  M a jo r  shif ts, e.g. into hor t i cu l tu re ,  
a re  needed  since,  fo r  A f r i ca  as a who le ,  m o re  tea, coffee, cocoa,  su ga r  
and  pe rha ps  cotton, tobacco  and o i l seed  expo r ts  wou ld  - g iven A f r ican  
m arke t  shares  and w o r ld  p r ice  e last i c i t ies  - be l ikely to reduce,  not  raise,  
tota l  net expo r t  earn ings
Most  a g r icu l tu ra l  output  g row th  o v e r  the past q ua r te r  of a cen tu ry  has 
c o m e  f ro m  cu l t i va t ing /g ra z in g  m o re  hec ta rage .  In most  coun t r ies  this 
c anno t  be counted on as a con t inued ,  let a lone  rad ica l ly  enhanced ,  c o n ­
t r ib u t i o n  to growth .  Fa rm ing  has pushed into sub-m arg ina l  (soi l  qua l i t y  
a n d / o r  assu red  ra infal l  def ic ien t)  areas  and  pushed pas to ra l i sm  out  into 
even  m o re  sub-m arg ina l  t racks.  The a pp a re n t  low-cu l t iva ted  to a rab le  
land ra t ios  are m is lead in g  because  lo ng- ro ta t io n ,  ' f a l l ow '  (u nde r  bush o r  
fo res t )  land  is not ava i lab le  fo r  ag r i c u l tu re  g iven kn ow n /v ia b le  t e c h n o lo ­
g ies  and  can be up to fo u r  t im es  the  area ac tua l l y  cu l t iva ted at any  one 
t im e .  A second m a jo r  cons t ra in t  is r u ra l  w o m e n ' s  w o rk lo a d  - often 14-16 
h ou rs  a day in rura l  SSA. No m ore  t ime can be put into a g r icu l tu re  u n ­
less it can be saved e lsewhere .
In the  shor t  run,  m a jo r  p ro du c t i v i t y  b re ak th ro ug h s  are un l ike ly  - the shel f  
of  re se a rch / te ch n iq u e s  adap ted ,  f ie ld - tes ted  and p roven  to be cost  eff i­
c ient ,  is ve ry  poo r ly  s tocked.  That  posi ts  an u rgen t  p r io r i t y  fo r  such re ­
search  now, but fo r  late 1990s and 2000s pay-of f.  In the shor t  run,  be t te r
-  10 -
access to marke ts ,  t ranspo r t ,  seeds,  hand and a n im a l  d ra w n  too ls  and 
fe r t i l i se rs  can ra ise output .  So can e x te n d in g  the  best  l o ca l l y /na t iona l l y  
used tech n iq ue s  (of ten adap te d  ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  ones  u n k n o w n  to the 
re s e a r c h /e x te n s io n  es tab l i shm ent )  and by f ree ing  w o m e n ' s  t im e  fo r  ag ­
r i cu l tu re  by im p ro v in g  access to basic hea l th  se rv ices ,  w a te r  and fuel 
w h ich  to g e th e r  can take up to e ight  hou rs  a day.
T ra n s p o r t  and  c o m m u n ic a t i o n  in SSA have gone  b a c k w a r d s  s ince 1979. 
De fe r red  m a in tena nce  and w a r  have w re c k e d  m a n y  once  adequate  
rou tes .  O the r  rura l  a reas neve r  d id have a d e q u a te  access  to t ra nsp o r t  - 
or,  the re fo re ,  to marke ts .  Poor  c o m m u n ic a t i o n  i n te rn a l l y  im p e d e s  data 
f low  and  red uce s  state and  e n te rp r ise  m a n a g e r ia l  e f f ic iency  - aga in  as 
the  resu l t  of gaps in n om ina l  co ve rag e  p lus  m a in te n a n c e  so long de­
fe r red  as to lead to en d e m ic  b re a k d o w n s .  Ex te rna l l y ,  t e l e c o m m u n i ­
ca t ions  have im p ro v e d  in the 1980s (as have  a i r  se rv ice s )  but  remain  
b e lo w  the  s ta n d a rd s  needed  fo r  ef f ic ient  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in g lo ba l  t rade.
To rega in  1970s basic t ra ns p o r t  s tan da rds ,  fi l l  the  m os t  g la r in g  gaps and 
a t ta in  m in im a l  a d eq ua te  dom es t ic  and ex te rn a l  c o m m u n ic a t i o n s  wi l l  - on 
W o r ld  Bank  es t ima tes  - requ i re  rap id  in c re a s e s  to the  y e a r  2000 of 
in v e s tm e n t /m a in te n a n c e ,  bu i ld -up  of ( low cost  and  l o w - i n c o m e  house ­
ho ld  ef fect ive,  but  sti l l  u n c o m m o n )  l a b o u r - i n te n s i v e  rural 
r o a d / t r a c k s /b r i d g e s / c u l v e r t s  cons t ruc t ion  (a l re a d y  d e m o n s t r a te d  to be 
feas ib le  and  f in an ceab le  in a w id e  ra n g e  of ILO and  g ove rn m e n t  
p ro jec ts ) ,  and  la b ou r - in te n s ive  m a in te n a n c e  m o re  g e n e ra l l y  (as is now 
be ing  begun  in M o z a m b iq u e 's  u rban  in f r a s t r u c tu re  rehab i l i ta t ion  
pro ject ) .
Indus t ry  in Afr ica ,  af te r  7 %  annua l  g ro w th  in the  1970s and  near  stag­
nat ion  o v e r  the  f i rst  hal f  of the 1980s, has re tu r n e d  to 3 -4 %  annual  
g ro w th .  For 4 -5 %  GDP g row th  and s t ruc tu ra l  t r a n s fo r m a t io n ,  at least 6% 
in d u s t r ia l  g ro w th  p e r  a n n u m  is needed  o v e r  the  1990s.
W i thou t  d o u b t  the uni t  costs,  ou tpu t  t r e n d s  and  s t ru c tu re s  of the  in dus ­
t r ia l  sec to rs  of most  A f r ican  e con o m ie s  (Z im b a b w e ,  B o ts w a n a ,  Maur i t ius.  
Tun is ia ,  A lg e r ia  and ,  poss ib ly ,  M a law i  and  Egypt  a re  e x c e p t io n s )  are un ­
sound .  W hy  th is  shou ld  be so is a c o m p le x  issue  v a r y in g  f ro m  coun try  
to co un t ry ,  i n d us t r y  to in d u s t ry  and  plant  to p lant .
One cause  is long  de fe r red  m a in te n a n c e  le a d in g  to  low  capaci ty 
u t i l i sa t ion  and  h igh  b re a k d o w n  costs.  A se c o n d  is h ea vy  d ep e n d e n c e  on 
b o r r o w e d  capi ta l  in a contex t  of h igh  in te res t  ra tes a nd  - f o r  external  
b o r r o w in g s  - h igh  real  d e va lu a t io n  costs .  A th i rd  is low  capaci ty  
u t i l i sa t ion  not  fo reseen  w hen  the p lants w e r e  bu i l t  (no r  unt i l  1980-82 rea­
s o na b ly  fo reseeab le ) ,  as a resul t  of im p o r t  ca pa c i ty  c o l la p s e  - a factor 
w h o s e  GDP m u l t ip l i e r  loss is g rea te r  w h e n  the  d i re c t  im p o r t  component
is low.  Related to th is  is low g row th  of ag r icu l tu ra l  raw mater ia l  p ro ­
duc t io n ,  wh ich  l im i ts  im p o r t  subs t i t u t ion  a n d /o r  capaci ty  ut i l isa t ion.  
Four th  is p lants too la rge fo r  nat ional  marke ts ,  e i the r  f rom the star t  o r  as 
a resul t  of the 1980s' co l lapse  of marke t  g row th .  Fifth are wh i te  e lephants  
wh ich ,  e i the r  ini t ia l ly,  o r  w i th  changed  w o r ld  re la t ive  prices,  cannot  ever  
be v iab le .  Sixth are uni t  la b o u r  costs.  Here  a d ich o to m y  exists.  In much 
of  F ra n c o p h o n e  Afr ica these a pp e a r  to re la te  to too h igh real wages  and,  
espec ia l l y ,  sa lar ies.  But  in much of A n g lo p h o n e  and L uso pho ne  Afr ica,  
the  reverse  is t rue:  real  wages  and sa la r ies  are be low the m in im u m  'e f ­
f ic ie ncy  wage ' .  As a resul t ,  absen tee ism ,  low mora le ,  d is in cen t ives  to 
im p ro v e  ski l ls and thef t make  l o w e r  w a ges  p e r  w o r k e r  ra ise  la b o u r  cos ts  
p e r  un i t  o f  output .  W o rke rs  - l ike fa rm e rs  and m a nagers  - do respond  to 
e c o n o m ic  incent ives ... and  d is incen t ives .
Ev iden t ly  the a pp ro p r ia te  rem e d ies  fo r  these  causes vary .  Only fo r  'wh i te  
e le ph a n ts '  is speedy  l i qu id a t io n  u n a m b ig u o u s ly  sound.  Nor,  fo r  the rest, 
is instan t  t rade  l ibe ra l i sa t ion  - as oppo sed  to phased l ibe ra l i sa t ion  s tar t ­
ing wi th  inputs and g iv ing  t im e  fo r  re cupe ra t ion  (as launched by 
Z im b a b w e  in 1990) - l ike ly  to be opt im al .
Th ree  new l ines of s t ra teg ic  focus a p p e a r  a pp rop r ia te .  First, p re -e x p o r t  
p ro c e s s in g  a nd  m a n u fa c tu r i n g  (e.g. cocoa  p a s te /po w d e r /bu t te r /o i l ,  sawn 
t im b e r / v e n e e r /p l y w o o d  fu rn i tu re  par ts,  lea ther  shoe par ts / f in ished  
le a th e r  goods).  Second,  b ro a d  m a r k e t  consum er ,  in te rmed ia te ,  co n ­
s t ruc t ion  and s im p le  capi ta l  goods .  Th i rd ,  a g r o - in d u s t ry  both b ro a de n ing  
d e m a n d  for  dom es t ic  ag r icu l tu ra l  p roduc ts  and inc reas ing  effect ive rura l  
d e m a n d  fo r  manufac tu res .  The second and  th i rd  ca tegor ies  w ou ld  usu ­
a l l y  be helped  by, and often requ ire ,  re g io n a l / sub - reg io n a l  marke ts .  For 
t h e m  to f lou r ish ,  e cono m ic  in te g ra t io n / c o o rd in a t io n  must  go beyond  tar i f f  
p re fe ren ces  to look at know ledge ,  c o m m u n ica t io n s ,  t ranspo r t  and g u i d ­
ance  tow a rd  spec ia l i sa t ion  (and away  f ro m  dup l i ca t iv e  su rp lus  capaci ty) .  
A n d  coun t r ie s  with h ighe r  ini t ia l  m a nu fa c tu red  export  potent ia l  - e.g. 
Kenya .  Z im ba b w e  - must  r e m e m b e r  that  the  basic purpose  of expor ts  is 
to secure  im por ts  and that the i r  SSA marke ts  have no great  ab i l i t y  to 
ra ise  reg iona l  im por ts  if they  have to pay in hard cu rrency ,  a point  also 
re le van t  to the 'new '  South Afr ica .  V igo rous ,  sus ta ined t rade  e xpans ion  
re q u i re s  at ten t ion  to iden t i f y ing  potent ia l  im po r ts  (which can inc lude  
t r a n s p o r t ,  ene rgy  and ra w  mater ia ls )  and mak in g  them actual .
Energy  poses two qui te d i f fe rent  p rob le m s .  The f irst is excess ive  d e ­
p e n d e n ce  on p e t ro leum  (in d i f fe rent  ways  fo r  im po r te rs  and exporte rs ) .  
F o r  im p o r te rs ,  this points tow ard  inc reased  use of hyd roe lec t r i c  potent ia l  
(not  least  on a reg iona l  basis as is b eg inn ing  in Southern  Afr ica) ,  coal 
(when  ava i lab le )  and natu ra l  gas ( found in several  States wi th no p roven  
l iqu id  h yd roca rbo ns ) .  Fo r  expor te rs ,  it im p l i es  d ive rs i f ica t ion  - in c lu d ing ,  
but not  l im i ted  to, na tu ra l  gas and its a m m o n ia /u re a  product ,  com p lex
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and s im p le  p e t ro ch e m ica ls  - and b u i ld in g  up e q u a l i s a t io n  reserves in 
fo re ig n  e xchan ge  in good  years (e.g. 1990-91) to c u s h io n  a d jus tm e n t  to 
p r ice  co l lapse  as in 1986 and 1988-89.
The o th e r  p ro b le m  - the l a rg e r  one in t e rm s  of e n e r g y  used  and house ­
ho lds  af fected d i rec t ly  - is w o o d  fuel .  D e fo res ta t ion  is making 
w o o d /c h a r c o a l  cos t l ie r  in ci t ies,  in c reas ing  the  w o r k l o a d  of the rura l 
w o m e n  w ho  col lect  it and co n t r ibu t in g  to soi l  e ro s io n  and neo ­
d ese r t i f i ca t ion .  H o u seho ld  and c o m m u n i t y  a g r o - fo re s t r y  can - o v e r  t ime 
- re ve rse  th is  t rend ,  usua l l y  by m ix ing  fuel,  b u i ld i n g  m a te r ia l ,  f o d d e r  and 
food  p r o v id i n g  t rees.  Pure p lan ta t ions  m ay  be s u i ta b le  f o r  u rb an  fue l l ing  
and  fo r  pu lp  m i l ls  but  are  an i n a p p ro p r ia te  te c h n ic a l  f ix fo r  the 
eco lo g ic a l - r u ra l  h ou se h o ld  fuel sc issors.
(3) Pover ty :  Access ,  P roduc t iv i t y  and Peop le
By  the  most  c o n se rva t ive  es t imate .  30 %  o f  S u b - S a h a r a n  a nd  abou t  
27.5% o f  a l l  A f r i c a n s  ( in c lu d in g  N o r th e r n  a n d  S ou th  A f r i c a )  a re  a b s o ­
lu te l y  p o o r  as set out  in the pub l i shed  text  of the  1990 W or ld  D e v e lo p ­
m e n t  Report .  On the s l igh t ly  less aus te re  basis  used  in an e a r l ie r  draft 
of the  repor t ,  the p ro p o r t io n  came to 4 0 % .  On e i t h e r  d e f in i t i o n  it is r i s ­
ing; a ch a rac te r is t i c  un ique  to Afr i ca  (both  SSA a nd  al l  Afr ica )  and 
s h a rp ly  d iv e rg e n t  f ro m  As ia  in c lud ing  its la rge ,  l o w - i n c o m e  coun t r ies .
Na t io na l l y ,  abso lu te  pove r ty  ranges f rom o v e r  6 0 %  (e.g. M ozam b ique ,  
E th iop ia ,  p ro b a b ly  M a la w i)  to u n d e r  2 0 %  (e.g. M a u r i t i u s .  Seychel les.  
Cape  V e rde  and - on a c o m p a ra b le  basis - B o tsw a n a ) .  T here  is a high 
nega t i ve  co r re la t io n  w i th  war.  The pos i t i ve  one  w i th  o u tp u t  p e r  capi ta is 
uneven .  States w i th  dem on s t ra te d  po l ic y  c o n c e rn  f o r  re la t i ve  equal i ty,  
o r  at least  f o r  e nsu r in g  m in im u m  access to in c o m e  a n d  se rv ice s  fo r  all 
c i t i zens,  e.g. Tanzan ia ,  M o z a m b iqu e ,  Cape  V e rde ,  B o ts w a n a ,  Maur i t ius  
and  Z im b a b w e ,  do be t te r  on pove r ty  ind ices  than  GDP p e r  capi ta  wou ld  
sugges t ;  and  those  w i th  no such a pp l ie d  c o n c e rn  (w h a te v e r  t h e i r  rhe to ­
ric) e.g. Ma la w i ,  A ng o la ,  N iger ia .  Z a m b ia ,  Sou th  A f r i ca ,  C am eroon ,  
Sud an  and  Eth iop ia  (ou ts ide  the core  h ig h la n d  p ro v in c e s )  do  s ign i f i can t ly  
wo rse .
The causes  of  a bso lu te  p ove r ty  are both s t ru c tu ra l  a nd  c o n ju n c tu r a l ;  lack 
of  access  to land, e m p lo y m e n t  a n d / o r  sk i l l s  (s t ruc tu ra l  p o v e r t y )  and lack 
of re h ab i l i ta t io n  su pp o r t  a n d /o r  safety nets d u r in g ,  o r  af te r ,  d isasters,  
e.g. d ro u g h t  and w a r  at macro - le ve l ,  i l l ness ,  f i re,  i n ju r y  o r  death  at 
h o u s e h o ld  level (con junc tu ra l ) .  H ow ever ,  in the  a b s e n c e  of  l i ve l ihood 
re h a b i l i ta t io n ,  c o n jun c tu ra l  p ove r ty  re la t i ve ly  r a p id l y  b e c o m e s  st ructura l  
and  p e rm a n e n t  f o r  most  of those  af f l ic ted.
W h i le  h i g h e r  ou tpu t  p e r  p e rs o n  is no g u a r a n te e  o f  f a l l i n g  a b s o lu te  p o v ­
e r ty ,  f a l l ing  GDP p e r  cap i ta  in l o w  p r o d u c t i v i t y  e c o n o m i e s  is a v i r tua l
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g u a r a n te e  o f  r i s ing  a b s o lu te  p o v e r t y  both in total nu m b e rs  and as a 
p r o p o r t io n  of househo ld s .  The 1980-90 fall of 20-25% in a ve rag e  A f r i can  
real GDP per capi ta is a m a jo r  cause of r i s ing  pove rty ;  the re tu rn  to r i s ing  
ou tpu t  p e r  person  of abou t  hal f  the e con o m ie s  in recent  years  is a s ign 
of  hope.
St ra teg ies  fo r  re d uc in g  abso lu te  pove r ty  rest on fou r  legs: e na b l in g  p o o r  
p e o p le  to be m o re  p ro d u c t i v e ;  a ch iev ing  u n iv e rs a l  access  to bas ic  s e r ­
v ices  (heal th, educa t ion ,  water ,  ex tens ion) ;  i m p r o v in g  bas ic  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; and p ro v id in g  sa fe ty  ne ts  ( fami ly ,  c o m m u n i t y  o r  State) fo r  
those  who  cannot  ( te m p o ra r i l y  o r  pe rm a nen t l y )  p roduce  more .  This is 
no l o n g e r  an area of mass ive  d is a g re e m e n t  in p r inc ip le .  However ,  only 
the  basic serv ices  and in f ras t ruc tu re  co m p on e n ts  are even reasonab ly  
we l l  a r t icu la ted .  How to devo te  ef for ts  to raise smal l  fa rm er ,  m i c r o ­
e n te rp r ise  and fo rma l  o r  in fo rma l  e m p lo y e e  ab i l i t y  to p ro du c e  is ne i the r  
we l l  researched  nor  e f fect ive ly  pu rsued .  Safety nets are  - except  fo r  
su rv iva l  re l ie f  backed by food a id - st i l l ,  on balance,  f ray ing  because  
o ve r lo a d  and social  change  are b reak in g  fam i l y  s t rands  fas te r  than new 
c o m m u n i t y  o r  state ones can be dev ised  and  bui l t  up.
Food  insecur i ty  is an aspect  of p ove r ty  and a m ark  of peo p le 's  v u ln e r ­
ab i l i t y  to being p lu nged  into poverty .  M od era te  and severe  chi ld  
m a ln u t r i t i o n  in Afr ica ranges  f rom  2 5 %  to near ly  7 0 %  (and severe  f rom 
2 -20%).  Food im por ts  have r isen d ra m a t i c a l l y  to about  6 %  of all ca lo r ies  
(but  up to 2 0 %  in most  se r io us  food def ic i t  cases l ike M o za m b iq u e )  and 
- m o re  crucia l  - are d o m in a n t l y  food  aid because,  wi th  few excep t ions,  
m a ss ive  food def ic i ts  re late to overa l l  e con o m ic  d isas ter ,  not to suc ­
cessfu l  spec ia l i sa t ion  in non-food  p roduc ts .
B ecau se  SSA ( indeed Afr ica)  has ve ry  l im i ted  app l i cab le  kn ow led g e  on 
h ow  to ra ise p ro d u c t iv i t y  th r o u g h  techn o log ica l  change,  shor t - te rm  
m e a s u re s  need to focus on input  supp ly ,  marke t  access and effect ive 
m o b i l i s a t io n  and use of food  a id na t iona l ly ,  and on smal l  f a r m e r  e n a b l ­
ing,  d isa s te r  v ic t im  l i ve l i hoo d  rehab i l i ta t ion  and e m p lo y m e n t  a u g m e n ta ­
t ion  ( i nc lud ing  la bou r  in tens ive  pub l i c  wo rks )  in respect  to house ho ld  
food  secur i t y  en t i t lemen ts  f rom  p ro d u c t io n  (of food o r  in co m e  to ex ­
c hange  fo r  it).
W o m e n  - espec ia l l y  fem a le -he a de d  h ou se h o ld s  (perhaps  2 0 %  of all 
A f r i ca n  househo ld s )  - are d is p ro p o r t io n a te ly  rep resen ted  in the a b s o ­
lu te ly  p o o r  and food  in secure  ca tegor ies .  In many  coun t r ies ,  e.g. 
M o z a m b iq u e  and Botswana,  the m a jo r i t y  of  abso lu te ly  p o o r  h o useho lds  
are  fem a le -headed .  W o m e n 's  w o rk lo a d  in rura l  areas  and low access to 
sk i l ls  a n d / o r  e m p lo y m e n t  to be p ro d u c t ive  in u rban  areas ,  are m a jo r  
b a r r ie rs  to inc reas ing  both food  p ro d u c t io n  and p oo r  u rban  hou se ho ld  
incom es .  Concern  a b o u t  g e n d e r  d iv is io ns  o f  labour ,  w o m e n ' s  exc lus ion
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f r o m  d ec i s ion s  a n d  u n e q u a l  access  to l a n d / s k i l l s / e m p l o y m e n t  is not. in 
A f r i c a , s im p ly  e g a l i t a r ia n ,  h u m a n i t a r i a n  n o r  - in a ny  n a r r o w  sense - 
fem in is t .  I t  is c e n t r a l  to the re d u c t io n  o f  n a t i o n a l  a n d  h o u s e h o ld  food  
i n s e c u r i t y ,  the  n u m b e r  o f  h o u s e h o ld s  e x is t in g  in a b s o lu te  p o v e r t y  and - 
in a n u m b e r  o f  cases  - to su b s ta n t ia l  in c re a s e s  in the  ra te  o f  g ro w th  of  
p r o d u c t i o n .
A r t i c u la t i o n  of ac t ion  lags  b e h in d  the a c c e p ta n c e  o f  the  n e e d  fo r  it. Data 
on fe m a le -h e a d e d  h ou se ho ld s  - let a lone  t h e i r  p e r c e p t io n s  of  t h e i r  needs 
and  capab i l i t ies  - is l im i ted ;  p ro v is io n  of v o c a t io n a l  t ra in in g ,  of ex tension 
se rv ices  and  of e m p lo y m e n t  is sti l l  o ften una b le  (a lm os t  l i te ra l l y )  to see 
w o m e n .  However ,  d r ive s  tow ard  un ive rsa l  l i te racy  and  bas ic  educa t ion  
and  hea l th  se rv ices  do benef i t  w o m e n  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a te l y  because  they 
have had the  least access  to them  and because  the  b u r d e n  of ca r ing  for  
the  s ick  fa l ls  p r im a r i l y  on them.  S im i la r ly ,  a ccess ib le  pu re  w a te r  supp l ies 
and  w o o d fu e l  save p r im a r i l y  w o m e n ' s  and  g i r l s '  t im e  and  of fe r  c lear  po­
tent ia l  both  fo r  im p r o v in g  chi ld  care  and  in c re a s e d  p r o d u c t i o n  at peak 
a g r i c u l tu ra l  seasons.  In m an y  A f r ican  c o u n t r ie s  these  rea l i t ie s  are being 
pe rce ive d  and ,  to a degree ,  acted upon,  and  w o m e n ' s  se l f -o rgan iza t ion  
fo r  p ro d u c t io n  is a dva n c in g .  Wh i le  the d r i v in g  fo rce  is f re q u e n t l y  w o m ­
en 's  g ro up s ,  p ro g res s  is c lea r ly  less s lo w  and  pa in fu l  w h e n  the State a l ­
locates re sources ,  p ro v id e s  an enab l in g  legal  f r a m e w o r k  and  seeks to 
a l te r  t ra d i t i o n a l  l im i t ing  p e rcep t ions  of w o m e n ' s  ro les.
A f r ica  is the  most  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  a t  r i sk  con t ine n t .  Un fo r tuna te ly ,  as 
w i th  debt ,  it is not  a m a jo r  th rea t  to the o z on e  la y e r  o r  c o m p a ra b le  to 
Nor th  o r  Sou th  A m e r ic a ,  East As ia  o r  E urope  in its ' c o n t r i b u t i o n '  to global  
w a rm in g .  Thus it t end s  to be m a rg in a l i s e d  in g lo ba l  re se a rch  and re­
so u rce  a l locat ion .  In that sense, w i ld l i f e  and  w i l d e r n e s s  conse rva t ion is ts  
a re  a b less ing  - they  do keep SSA on the  w o r ld  e n v i r o n m e n ta l  agenda.  
D e fo res ta t ion  ( in c lu d in g  bushes  and sh rubs ) ,  soi l  e ro s io n  and neo­
dese r t i f i ca t io n  are  a d v a n c in g  at a la rm in g  ra tes  w i th  s o m e  d a m a g in g  cl i ­
ma t ic  shi f ts a l re a d y  b ru ta l l y  ev iden t  (e.g. the  le ng th  and  in tens i t y  of the 
H a rm a t tan  on the West  A f r ican  coast  has t r e b le d  o v e r  the  past  30 years 
in w ays  per fec t ly  v is ib le  to a nyon e  w ho  v is i t s  at i n te r v a ls  and has a 
co m p a ra t i v e ,  m e n ta l - snapsho t  m e m o ry -b a n k ) .  The key im m e d ia te  cause 
fo r  most  e n v i ro n m e n ta l  d am a g e  is need,  and  the  w o rs t  d a m a g e rs  are 
p o o r  h o u s e h o ld s  w h o  must  d es t ro y  n ow  to s u rv iv e  now ,  even  though  
they  k n ow  (and care)  that  the i r  ac t ions  l im i t  and  e n d a n g e r  t h e i r  and thei r  
c h i l d r e n ' s  fu tu re  l i ve l ihoods .
The im p l i c a t io n s  fo r  s t ra tegy  are  c lear :  in pu ts  of  k n o w le d g e ,  too ls  and 
fe r t i l ise r ,  to enab le  p o o r  fa rm in g  h o u s e h o ld s  to g r o w  m o r e  w i tho u t  d am ­
a g ing  the  land,  are c rucia l .  Low t i l lage,  in te r - c r o p p in g  and  re d u c in g  na­
ked soi l  su r faces  are  exam ples .  S im i la r ly ,  h o u s e h o ld ,  co -o p e ra t ive  and 
smal l  c o m m u n i t y  t ree  and bush p lan t ing  based  on m e e t in g  fuel,  bui ld ing
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m ater ia l ,  f o d d e r  and food needs can - as dem on s t ra ted  in a n u m b e r  of 
E th iop ian  and Tanzan ian  cases - ach ieve  rapid suppor t  because  it 
d e m o n s t ra b l y  enhances  presen t  l i ve l ihoods  as wel l  as p ro tec t ing  fu tu re  
ones  th rou g h  eros ion  con t ro l  and re duc t io n  of neo -deser t i f i ca t ion  d a n ­
gers .  Where  the re  is mass ive  inequa l i ty  in access to land,  so too  does 
land re fo rm  des igned  to b roaden  access to land and to enhance  secur i t y  
of  tenure .
But ,  desp i te  some k n ow ledg e  and successes,  the e nv i ron m e n ta l  bat t le  is 
st i l l  be ing lost. One reason  is the rapid expa ns io n  of c rop p ing  into s u b ­
m a rg in a l ,  eco log ica l l y  f rag i le  areas  and the consequen t ia l  push ing  of 
l ives tock  ra is ing  into even m o re  d ro u g h t - p r o n e  and vu ln e ra b le  eco log ica l  
zones.  Both increase  food  insecur i ty  f ro m  crop  fa i lu re  and an ima l  
losses,  and both th rea ten  to con t inue  the r i s ing  t rend  of eco-des t ruc t ion .
T h e i r  basic cause is r a p id  p o p u la t i o n  g ro w th  in the absence of a paral le l  
ab i l i t y  to in tensi fy  a g r icu l tu re  and re duce  requ i red  fa l low  year  rat ios.  
A f r i ca n  popu la t ion  g row th  is es t imated  at a ro un d  3 % ,  a l t ho ugh  th is  is 
p ro b a b ly  an ove r -es t ima te  (just as pre-1965 est imates  we re  usua l ly  
unde r -es t im a tes ) .  Even if 2 .75% is the real rate, it is excess ive  in respect  
to eco logy ,  re sources  fo r  p ro v id ing  basic se rv ices  fo r  w o m e n 's  and c h i l ­
d r e n ' s  heal th, and re la t ive  to ach ieved  le ve ls / t ren ds  of a g r icu l tu ra l  p r o ­
duc t iv i ty .
To date,  popu la t ion  po l i cy  has focused on b i r th cont ro l  o r  - m o re  in l ine 
w i th  actua l  A fr i can p e rcep t ions  - b i r th s p ac ing / fa m i ly  p lann ing .  This has 
had som e success,  espec ia l l y  in m id d le - in c o m e  coun t r ies  and a m o ng  
m id d le - i n c o m e  groups.  It is, however ,  incomple te .  Fa l l ing  in fan t  m o r ­
ta l i t y ,  r i s ing  fem a le  l i te racy ,  r e d u c e d  food  in se cu r i t y  and  m o r e  a s s u red  
o ld  a ge  s ecu r i t y  a re  both  h is to r ica l l y ,  a nd  in Afr ica ,  c lose ly  a ssoc ia te d  
with  b i r th  ra te  dec l ines .  Ac t ion  to p ro m o te  them (as par t of a genera l  
d r i v e  to reduce  poverty )  w o u ld  create the cond i t ions  in wh ich  p ro v id in g  
access  to fam i l y  p lann in g  know led ge  and te ch n o lo g y  w ou ld  be fa r  more  
d e s i re d  and effect ive than  it can be today .  Further ,  none of them  is co n ­
t ro ve rs ia l ,  unl ike  the rhe to r ic  of the t rue  be l ieve rs  in b i r th rate red uc t ion  
at al l  costs.
The e co n o m ic  impact  of AIDS  on SSA is c le a r ly  se r ious  and g ro w in g .  In 
mos t  coun t r ies  be tween 3 %  and 2 0 %  of the adu l t  popu la t ion  are poss ib ly  
HIV se ropos i t ive .  That pe rcen tage  is sti l l  r is ing.  In several  co un t r ie s '  
hosp i ta ls  A IDS/A IDS-re la ted  d iseases  are the largest  cause of death  in 
the  15-50 age group .  O v e r  the 1990s the re  are l ike ly  to be up to f ive 
m i l l i o n  AIDS o rp hans  (up to 4 0%  d o o m e d  f rom  bi rth) and 10 m i l l i on  AIDS 
dea ths .  The human, househo ld ,  e co n o m ic  and social  costs are on ly  too 
ev iden t .
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The im pac t  on p op u la t i o n  and la b o u r  fo rce  is less c lear .  Ef fect ive action 
aga in s t  m a ln u t r i t i o n  and ma la r ia  cou ld  re d u ce  d ea ths  m o re  than AIDS is 
l ike ly  to ra ise  them.  H ow  fast p rac t i ces  c o n d u c i v e  to HIV t ransm iss ion  
are  c h an g in g  is unc lea r ,  as is the fu tu re  t r a je c to r y  of in fect ion  wi thout  
such  changes .  So, too ,  is the date of d e v e lo p m e n t  of an ef fect ive vaccine 
o r  t h e ra p y  fo r  the  in fec ted.  V is ions  of m o re  than  local  d ep o p u la t io n  are 
as u n rea l is t i c  as those  w h ich  say AIDS is b as ica l l y  a n o r th e rn  p rob lem 
and  of m in o r  c o nce rn  to Afr ica .  M o re  re levan t  is the  w a r n in g  that  Afr ica 
is of m in o r  conce rn  to those  d e v e lo p ing  vac c in es  and  d ru gs ;  Afr icans 
are  too  p o o r  and  m a rg in a l  to r e n d e r  the e x p lo i t a t io n  of  th e m  and the i r  
d isease  pa t te rns  w id e ly  a t t rac t ive  - w h e th e r  f o r  e c o n o m ic  ga in  or  in te l ­
lec tua l  kudos .
(4) Ex terna l  E conom ic  R e la t ionsh ip s :  P ess im is t i c  P ro b le m a t i c ?
The w o r ld  e c o n o m y  s ince 1960 has - w i th  b r ie f  e x c e p t io n s  - evo lved  in 
w ays  d is t inc t l y  unhe lp fu l  to Afr ica .  In the  1980s, the  p u rc h a s in g  power 
in te rm s  of im p o r ts  of most  m a jo r  A f r i can  n on -o i l  e x p o r ts  fel l  by 50%  and 
fo r  oil (g ran ted  f rom  a h igh s tar t ing  point )  the  s lu m p  to mid-1990 was 
abou t  as great .  M a ny  e co n o m ie s  have lost  up to a ten th  of the pu rchas ­
ing p o w e r  of t he i r  na t iona l  p rodu c t  and a th i r d  of t h e i r  im p o r t  capaci ty  
as a resul t .
W h i le  A f r i can  expo r ts  in phys ica l  te rm s  have  g r o w n  by pe rha ps  3 %  a 
y e a r  in the  1980s, a t u r n a r o u n d  f ro m  s ta g n a t io n  o r  d e c l in e  in the 1970s. 
f o r  most  co un t r ie s  th is  has not  been e n o u g h  to of fset t e rm s  of t rade 
shif ts , so that  earned  im p o r t  capac i t y  has a c tua l l y  fa l len.
B eca use  p r i va te  and  c o m m e rc ia l  capi ta l  in f lo w s  have ,  o v e r  the  same pe­
r iod ,  gone  nega t i ve  and  d e b t  se rv ice  a c tu a l l y  p a i d  r isen ,  by 1989, to 
$17.8 b i l l i on  (23% o f  $76 b i l l i on  expo r ts ) ,  even  the  4 %  (1%  per capita) 
annua l  real  r ise of Of f ic ial  D e ve lo p m e n t  A s s is ta n c e  d is b u rs e m e n ts  con­
cen t ra ted  in the f i rst  yea rs  of the decade  a nd  the  b u i l d - u p  of mass ive  ar­
rea rs  (on ly  abou t  h a l f  p re - r e s c h e d u l i n g  d e b t  s e rv i c e  is in fact  being  
pa id )  have ,  at best, ave r te d  im p o r t  cuts f o r  m os t  A f r i c a n  e con om ies .  Cuts 
of up to 5 0 %  (67% p e r  cap i ta )  b e lo w  late 1970s le ve ls  have,  nonetheless,  
been re c o rd e d  fo r  so m e  co un t r ies  in s o m e  years .  Th is  has b ro ug h t  abi l ­
i ty to invest ,  m a in ta in  and  opera te  p r o d u c t i v e  a nd  in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  capaci ty 
d o w n  to levels wh ich ,  in severa l  cases,  can o n ly  be te r m e d  import  
s t ra n g u la t i o n .
W orse ,  the re  are no c le a r  ways  out . T e rm s  of t r a d e  f o r  m os t  A f r i can  ex­
por ts  canno t  rea l i s t ica l l y  be expec ted  to r e c o v e r  s ign i f i can t ly  in the 
1990s. Fo r  many,  w o r ld  p r i ce  e las t ic i t ies  a re  so low  tha t  fo r  A fr i ca  as a 
w h o le ,  l a rg e r  expor t  v o lu m e s  w o u ld  m ean  lo w e r  e a rn in g s .  This brutal
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fact  has been repea ted ly  u n d e rp lay e d  by the Wor ld  Bank  and in the 
F rase r  C o m m is s io n 's  UN Report .
To rega in  sus ta inab le  ex te rna l  ba lance  - even with s low ly  r i s ing  ODA 
f lo ws  and re sch edu l ing  of deb t  - SSA e con o m ie s  need to d eve lop  new 
expo r ts .  In genera l ,  these lie in p ro cess in g  o r  m anu fac tu r ing  su i tab le  
ra w  m a te r ia ls  (e.g. logs,  h ides  and skins, cacao beans) before  export ;  
e xp lo i t in g  potent ia l  fo r  new raw m a te r ia ls -based  exports  wi th  bet te r  
p ro s p e c ts  (e.g. hor t i cu l tu re ,  fe r t i l ise rs  based on natural  gas and se lected 
o th e r  m a nu fac tu re d  p ro du c ts  - in c lu d in g  capi ta l  goods)  p r im ar i l y ,  but not 
w h o l l y ,  to reg iona l  marke ts .  In prac t ice,  n e i th e r  s t rateg ies ,  data bases 
o r  ins t i tu t ions  for  such an e xpo r t  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  have been begun in 
mos t  A f r ican  coun tr ies ,  no r  do they  f igu re  on Wor ld  Bank  st ra teg ic  
agendas .
Externa l  deb t  now stands at near ly  $300 b i l l ion  (SSA $175 bi l l i on,  North 
A f r ic a  $100 bi l l ion,  RSA $25 bi l l ion) .  If fu l ly  se rv iced  it wou ld  eat up ove r  
$30 b i l l ion  of total  e xpo r ts  of the o r d e r  of $80 b i l l i on and about  15% of 
GDP.
C le a r ly  fu l l  d e b t  se rv ice  is an 'a l t e r n a t i v e '  to su rv iv a l  and  g ro w th .  The 
p re sen t  uneasy  c o m p ro m is e  of 50-60% se rv ic in g ,  20-25% reschedu l ing  
and  15-25% a r rea rs  bu i ld -up  cannot  last, even if it is cu r ren t ly  less d a m ­
a g ing  than e i the r  open  defaul t  o r  ful l  paym ent .  At  leas t  an a v e ra g e  50%  
w r i te - o f f  ( f rom 0 %  fo r  Bo tswana,  L ibya and M aur i t ius  to near 100% for  
M o z a m b iq u e .  Tanzan ia  and Sudan)  is necessa ry  if susta ined recovery  of 
A f r i ca n  g row th  and g ro w th  of indus t r ia l  e c o n o m y  expor ts  to A fr i ca  (es­
p ec ia l l y  SSA) is to be ach ieved,  fn the in te r im ,  b ro a d e r  ( inc lud ing  all 
de b t  de j u r e  o r  de facto),  so f ter  ( l i tt le o r  no cu r ren t  payment  fo r  several  
years) ,  lo n ge r  (all 1990s p aym en ts  due covered  in one re sch edu l ing  
exe rc ise  fo r  the most  deb t -d is t ressed )  re sch ed u l in g  wou ld  save scarce 
p e rs o n n e l  t im e  and enab le  coheren t  fo rw a rd  p lann ing  by A fr i can 
g o v e rn m e n ts  and the i r  exte rna l  co op e ra t in g  par tners.
The 1991 'T r in ida d  te rm s '  are a step tow a rd  reduc t io ns  of the necessary  
o r d e r  of magn i tude .  Basical ly ,  they  call f o r  5 0%  wri te-of fs  fo r  all off icial  
deb t  (and im p l i c i t ly  fo r  paral le l  'B r a d y '  t ype  ac t ion on com m erc ia l  bank 
deb t )  in respec t  of deb t -d is t ressed  lo w - in c o m e  count r ies.  The p recedents  
(h o w e v e r  v ehem e n t l y  th is  is den ie d )  and m o de ls  are ev iden t ly  Poland 
and  Egypt .  There in  l ies the p ro b lem .  Bo th  are deb t -d is t ressed  lower  
m id d le  incom e-coun t r ies .  The i r  SSA a na lo gues  are Niger ia,  Cote 
d ' I v o i r e  and Kenya,  not  Tanzan ia ,  M oza m b iqu e ,  Somal ia  and 
M a d ag a sca r .  If the 'T r in ida d  t e r m s '  w e re  to be made  app l i cab le  to 
d eb t -d is t re sse d  m id d le - in c o m e  coun t r ies ,  and 75-100% w r i te -d o w n s  
ag re e d  fo r  deb t -d is t ressed ,  lo w - inco m e  coun t r ie s ,  one wou ld  at last be in 
bus iness .  Conce ivab ly ,  the so m e w h a t  a m b ig u o u s  w o rds  f rom the 1991
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L o n d o n  G7 mee t ing  may rep resen t  the b i r th  of top - ieve l  recogn i t ion,  
l inked  to w i l l i n gn e ss  to co n s id e r  ac t ion  in respec t  of tho se  real i t ies.
S im i la r ly ,  the p ro b le m  of ' n o n - re s c h e d u la b i l i t y '  and  'n i l  w r i te -o f fab i l i ty '  
o f deb t  owed  to the Bank  and the Fund is be ing  re s o lv ed  - even if pa in ­
fu l ly  s lowly .  The F u nd 's  Extended S t ruc tu ra l  A d ju s tm e n t  Faci l i ty  (ESAF) 
and the  B an k 's  new recogn i t ion  of severa l  SSA e c o n o m ie s  as In te rna­
t iona l  D e ve lo p m e n t  A ssoc ia t ion  ( IDA)-e l i g ib le  he lp  o v e r c o m e  the ' te rm s '  
p ro b le m  as do de facto (even if not  de j u r e )  ro l l - ove rs .  Fu r the r ,  the de 
facto  ' b u y in g  up '  of a r re a rs  to the Fund and  B a n k  by b i la te ra l  donors  
open s  a potent ia l  aven ue  fo r  m o re  gene ra l  l e ssen ing  of Fund /B an k  
o v e r h a n g s  befo re  they  go into a r rea rs .  S low  as the  p r o g r e s s  is, 1991 is 
v e ry  d i f fe ren t  f rom  1981 when  the ve ry  e x is tence  of  a ge n e ra l i se d  SSA 
ex te rna l  deb t  b u rden ,  wh ich  was c r ip p l in g  g ro w th  and  wh ich ,  in large 
part,  cou ld  n e v e r  be repa id  and  n e ed ed  w r i t i n g  d o w n  (not just 
n on -c o n c es s io n a l  resch ed u l ing ) ,  was not  m e re ly  a m in o r i t y  perspect ive  
but  a v i r tu a l l y  non-ex is ten t  one.
G ross  ODA  to SSA has r isen by abou t  4 %  a y e a r  in the  1980s (but con ­
cen t ra ted  in 1981-84) to $15 b i l l i on  and ,  fo r  al l  A f r i ca ,  to pe rha ps  $22.5 
b i l l i on .  At  net level it is of the o r d e r  of $12.5 and  $17.5 b i l l i on  respec­
t ive ly .  W i th in  those  to ta ls  p e rhaps  3 0%  is tech n ica l  ass is tance  - largely 
spen t  on d o n o r  pe rson ne l  - and 2 0 %  d is a s te r  re l ief .
That  ODA has a v e r te d  wo rse  e c o n o m ic  d e c l in e  in SSA is not  rea l ly  open 
to d ispu te .  N o r  in d e e d  is the need fo r  its g ro w th  by 5 0 %  in the 1990s. 
as p ro p o s e d  by the  LTPS. But  its n a tu re  a n d  m a k e - u p  at  p r e s e n t  are  far  
f r o m  o p t im a l .  Too much  is p ro v id e d  and o p e ra te d  by d o n o r s  accord ing  
to t h e i r  own  pe rcep t io ns  of what  is needed  and  of  the  w a ys  to atta in this, 
w i th o u t  t ru l y  chann e l l ing  th rou g h  A f r ican  re g ion a l ,  n a t iona l  and  local in­
s t i tu t ions .  Too much  techn ica l  ass is tance  goes  to p r o v id i n g  d o n o r  na­
t io na ls  w i th  w o rk  and too  l i t t le goes  to t r a in in g  A f r i c a n s  (espec ia l l y  in 
Afr i ca) .  As a resul t .  ODA - h o w e v e r  in ten d ed  - o f ten d ecapac i ta tes .  cre ­
a t ing  the need fo r  its own  con t inu a t ion  ra th e r  than  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to na­
t iona l  ins t i tu t iona l ,  dec is ion - tak in g  and p e rs o n n e l  capa c i t ie s  and  al lowing  
s tab i l i sa t ion  and g radu a l  re duc t io n  of d e p e n d e n c e  on e x te rna l  assist ­
ance .
UNPAAERD Rev is i t ed
In its ea r ly  years ,  a UN d e v e lo p m e n t  fund  was  p ro p o s e d  u n d e r  the  t i t le UN
Fund fo r  E conom ic  D eve lop m en t ,  o r  UNFED. P oss ib ly  w is e r  in a c ro n y m s  than
today ,  the  pow ers - tha t -be  a l te red  th is  to Spec ia l  UN Fund f o r  Economic  De­
v e lo pm e n t ,  o r  SUNFED. However ,  so la r  p o w e r  p ro v e d  in a de qua te  and
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UNFED it was!  It is hard not  to sugges t  an ana lo gous  a m e n d m e n t  to 
UNPAAERD:  UN P ro g ram m e  fo r  A f r ican  Internal  Deve lopment,  o r  UNPAID.
The m i n i m u m  net  e x te rn a l  t ra n s fe rs  es t ima ted  in APPER, and in all 
1981-onward  W or ld  Bank rev iews  of SSA, ha ve  s im p ly  no t  h ap pen ed .  Net  
r e a l  p e r  cap i ta  t rans fe rs  o v e r  the UNPAAERD p e r io d  have  de c l in e d  by a bo u t  
2 %  a ye a r .  There  is s o m e th in g  in the  a rg u m e n t  that this is a resul t  of se lec ­
t iv i t y :  tho se  coun t r ies  adop t ing  and m a in ta in in g  SAPs wi th Ban k /Fu nd  seals 
of a p p ro v a l  (or  au tho rsh ip )  have had r i s ing  real per  capi ta net t rans fe rs :  
those  w i thou t  (even when  - e.g. Z im b a b w e  - they  had dom es t ica l l y  des igned  
SAPs.  4 %  g ro w th  rates, near ba lance  on cu r re n t  account ,  substant ia l  export  
and  food  p ro d u c t io n  g rowth  rates and inf la t ion  no w o rse  than many  a p p roved  
SAP coun t r ies )  have not. Indeed ,  as a g ro u p  they  have had fal ls in abso lu te ,  
n o m in a l  net resource  inf lows.  A co m b in a t io n  of m o re  accep tance  in cer ta in 
A f r i ca n  States of the need fo r  coheren t ,  sus ta in ab le  e cono m ic  pol icy and by 
the  in te rna t iona l  c o m m u n i t y  of m ore  f le x ib i l i t y  and con tex tua l i ty  of nat ional  
p r o g r a m m e s  m igh t  seem to sugges t  that,  o v e r  the  UNPAAERD per iod ,  a 4 %  
a y e a r  (1% per capi ta) increase  in real per  capi ta t rans fe rs  was read i l y  a t ­
t a inab le .  A p p ro v e d  SAP h o lde rs  seem to have a veraged  about  6 %  (3% per 
capi ta )  real  g row th  du r ing  p ro g r a m m e  years.  One must,  however,  w o n d e r  - 
c e r ta in ly ,  in pract ice,  the Bank  does.  R ea l loca t in g  re sources  is one th ing;  
e x p a n d in g  the m  is qui te ano the r.  The ev iden t  need fo r  funds  - a dm i t te d ly  to 
a subs tan t ia l  extent  inves tm en t  and t rade  cred i t ,  not  soft aid - in respect  of 
C en t ra l  and Eastern European co un t r ie s  and,  at some stage,  in respect  of 
G u l f /M id d le  East recons t ruc t ion ,  means  the re  is am p le  reason fo r  doub t  unti l  
the  fu n d in g  is not mere ly  p ledged  but  be ing d e l i ve red .
The one  real g row th  area in aid to SSA o v e r  the  past  hal f  decade  seems to 
have  been t e c h n ic a l  ass is tance  (TA).  Doub t le ss  useful  in some cases and 
essen t ia l  in cer ta in nea r -b re a kd o w n  contex ts ,  th is  g row th  is, nonethe less ,  
h ig h ly  p ro b le m a t i c  in s t ruc tura l  impact .  This has now reached the point  
w h e r e  techn ica l  assistance  sa la r ies  exceed nat iona l  pub l ic  serv ice  pay- ro l ls  
in severa l  States,  and w here  expa t r ia te  team s repor t  to each o the r  and to 
d o n o rs ,  but  on ly  nom ina l l y  to host g o v e rn m e n ts  even though  they p lay m a jo r  
o p e ra t io n a l  ro les. Wha tever  e lse th is  may  be, it is decapaci ta t ing .
T w e n ty  pe r  cent  less TA sa la ry  a l loca t ions ,  sw i t ched  to be made  ava i lab le  to 
n a t io na l  t reasu r ies  to pay an a g reed  set of sa la ry  and wages increases,  
w o u ld  have a capac i ta t ing  and p ro du c t i v i t y - ra is ing  potent ia l .  Whi le  some 
d o n o r s  a dm i t  th is  in pr ivate,  the top ic  sti l l  seem s to be far  f rom reach ing  se ­
r io u s  n ego t ia t ing  agendas  even in the  most  a s to und ing  im ba la nce  cases, 
such  as Tanzan ia  or  M o za m b iqu e ,  w h e re  c i t izens can (and do) ra ise t h e i r  in ­
c o m e s  o v e r  25- fold by leav ing  the  pub l i c  se rv ice  and w ork ing  fo r  a id a g e n ­
c ies  e i th e r  as staff m e m bers  o r  - m o re  t yp ica l l y  - as in dependen t  consu l tan ts  
o r  d o m e s t i c  'n o n -g o ve rn m en ta l  o rg an iz a t ion s ' .  One obstac le  is iner t ia  and 
a n o t h e r  the  ghost  of the 'capi ta l  costs:  g o o d / r e c u r r e n t  costs: bad '  s y n d r o m e
-  20  -
that p re va i led  unt i l  the mid-1980s.  For m a in ten a nc e  (of ten d isg u ise d  as cap­
ital), im p o r t s  (e.g. of d ru gs )  and ,  in the case of food  a i d / i m p o r t  support ,  
c o u n te r p a r t  fund s  m o re  w id e ly ,  that  v ie w  has e ro d e d .  But  it st i l l  seems to 
mean  that  i n te rna t iona l  agenc ie s ,  d o n o r  g o v e r n m e n ts  and  s o m e  NGOs pre fer  
to b r in g  in the i r  own peop le  (or, even wo rse ,  buy  out  g o v e r n m e n t  servants)  
to do a job  ra th e r  than  to d eve lo p  capac i ta t ing  sch e m e s  in vo lv in g  co­
o pe ra t io n  in na t iona l l y  d es ign e d  incen t ive  p r o g r a m m e s .
E x o g e n o u s  e v e n ts  have  bee n  d i re .  Natura l  d isa s te rs  - o v e ra l l  - do not  f igure 
p ro m in e n t l y .  (D rough t  was  less p reva le n t  o v e r  1985-90 than  o v e r  1970-79, let 
a lo ne  1980-84.) W or ld  m arke ts  do.  Te rm s  o f  t r a d e  d e c l in e s  o v e r  1986-90 
r e d u c e d  im p o r t  c a p a c i t y  m o r e  than n e t  r e s o u r c e  t r a n s fe r s  r a i s e d  it. This was 
p a r t i c u la r l y  the case fo r  l o w - inc o m e  e con om ies .  True,  th is  was  not  wi l l fu l ly  
caused  by N o r th e rn  e c o n o m ie s  (nor,  indeed ,  expe c ted  by th e m  in 1985). 
Equa l ly  t rue,  it does  not  in p ract ice  re late p r im a r i l y  to n e o - l i be ra l  pol icy  a d ­
v ice.  Ghana  and  Cote d ' I v o i r e  w ou ld ,  fo r  d i v e rg e n t  re asons ,  have more  or 
less d o u b le d  t h e i r  cocoa ou tpu t  ove r  1983-90 w i th  d is a s t r o u s  consequences  
even  had no o u ts id e r  a d v i s e d  them  to do so. ( Indeed  in that  respect ,  1983-90 
is a re ru n  of 1957-64 as to nat iona l  po l ic y  and  p rax is ,  and  as to W o r ld  Bank 
a dv i c e  and  to w o r ld  cocoa marke t  p r ice resu l ts) .  But  U N P A A E R D  was a 
b road  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  p ro jec t io n  m ode l  w h o se  e x p o r t  e a r n in g s  a s s um p t io n s  
w e re  a key  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  i ts a t t a i n a b i l i t y . In a con tex t  in w h ic h  these  were 
fa ls i f ied ,  the  North  d id have so m e  ob l iga t ion  to go back  to the  d ra f t in g  board 
as severa l  A f r ican  States sugges ted .  Only  in the  case  of Ghana,  w he re  the 
C o n su l ta t i ve  G roup  fa i r ly  exp l ic i t ly  ra ised f u n d in g  a f te r  1988's beg in n ing  of 
ful l  sca le  cocoa  pr ice co l lapse ,  has th is  c le a r ly  h a p p e n e d .
To put  th is  case is not  n ecessa r i l y  to re - ra ise  the  ta t te red  Fi rst  W ind ow  
C o m m o n  Fund banner :  a g loba l  Stabex;  low c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ,  fast  d isburs ing ,  
a d d i t i o n a l  IMF d ra w in g  r igh ts  on the ESAF m o d e l ;  a d d i t i o n a l  balance-of-  
p a y m e n ts  suppo r t ;  t ra de  l i b e ra l i sa t ion  on t r o p i c a l  p ro du c ts ;  p ro jec t  and 
p r o g r a m m e  su pp o r t  fo r  expo r t  d ive rs i f i ca t ion  (in p rac t i ce ,  the  most  u n d e r ­
fu n d e d  of all m a jo r  e c o n o m ic  sectors )  s in g ly  o r  t o g e t h e r  w o u ld  have been 
(and re m a in  today)  a l te rna t ives .  But  to say - in w o rd s ,  o r  by not  p rov id ing  
re s o u rc e s  o r  e m p o w e r m e n t  to ra ise  expo r t  e a r n in g s  - tha t  al l co rrect ive  
ac t ion  sh ou ld  fal l  on SSA States m ad e  and m ake s  no sense  in t e rm s  of the 
U N P A A E R D  ana lys is  and  its im p l i c i t  contrac t .
W ar was  n o t  f a c to re d  in to  UNPAAERD.  Indeed it is v e ry  ra re ly  fac to red  into 
na t io na l ,  let a lo ne  ex te rna l ,  e c on o m ic  ana lyse s  in a ny  s y s te m a t i c  way.  In 
par t ,  at least,  it was  - a nd  is - an e xo g e n o u s  even t  w h ic h  the  Nor th  could  a l ­
lev ia te  in mos t  cases.  The roo t  cause of the S o u th e rn  A f r i ca n  w a r  bi l l  is ex­
te rna l  i n te r ve n t io n  p r im a r i l y  by South A f r i ca ,  s e c o n d a r i l y  by the  USA. 
W h a te v e r  the  exac t  na tu re  of the  A n g o la n  conf l i c t ,  it w o u ld  have  been re­
so lved  be fo re  1980 had Sou th  A f r i ca  not  chosen  to i n te r v en e  and  the USA to 
v ie w  a ppe a ls  to M o s c o w  and Havana for  of fse t t ing s u p p o r t  as an oppo r tun i t y
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to e n g a g e  in p roxy  war.  M o z a m b iq u e  is an even c le a re r  case. The civi l  and 
re g io n a l  wa rs  of the Horn have fa r  d e e p e r  do m es t ic  and reg iona l  roots,  but 
they ,  too .  have been esca la ted (and p roba b ly  p ro longed )  mass ive ly  by e x ­
te rna l  geo-po l i t ica l  actors.
The - qu i te  recent  - Nor the rn  co n t r ibu t io n  of a dv is ing  mi l i t a ry  sp end ing  re ­
d u c t i o n s  w i th  resource  t ra n s fe r  sanc t ions  to lend we ig h t  to the adv ice  - even 
if backed  up by cu rb ing  a rm s  sa le sm en  - is a ra the r  b lunt  ins t rument .  Ser ious  
e n g a g e m e n t  in conf l ic t  l im i ta t ion  and reso lu t io n  on a m ore  soph is t ica ted  ba ­
sis w o u ld  seem more  l ike ly  to be effect ive, and  was notably absent  ove r  
1985-90 w i th  the ve ry  par t ia l  excep t io n  of p r o v id in g  a cover  for  South A f r ican  
e v a c u a t io n  of Ango la  and N am ib ia  fo l lo w in g  its c rush ing  defeats in the 
1987-88 Cu i to  Canava le  ca m p a ign .  For exam p le ,  Japan 's  p roposa l  to l ink its 
a id co n t r i b u t io n  to levels of m i l i t a ry  s p en d ing  is s im p l i s t i c  in the SSA c o n ­
text .  S e c u r i t y  - d e m o b i l i s a t io n  - re h a b i l i t a t i o n  a re  a l l  p re c on d i t i on s  fo r  m a jo r  
s p e n d in g  cuts.  An of fer to meet  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n  (basical ly  a paym ent  fo r  so l ­
d ie r s  of all fact ions to tu rn  in a rm s  and accept  d ischarge) ,  t ra in ing  and  ru ra l  
l i v e l i h o o d  re s to ra t io n  costs  w ou ld  f u r th e r  the stated goal,  be re la t ive ly  s im p le  
fo r  SSA States to des ign  and opera te ,  p ro v id e  real incent ives p lus ways  and 
m e a n s  to reduce  both conf l ic t  and a rm e d  fo rces  and,  there fo re ,  to make 
p os s ib le  qui te la rge m i l i t a ry  s p en d in g  cuts w i th o u t  the r isk of new civi l  wars  
o r  b a n d i t r y  sparked  by ex -com batan ts  w i thou t  jobs,  crafts, en te rp r i ses  or  v i ­
ab le  fa rm s ,  but wi th  guns.
The exten t  to wh ich  A fr ican e con o m ie s  have a do p te d  m ore  real is t ic  and more  
c on tex tua l  po l i c ies  var ies.  Most  have adap ted  to a chang ing  exte rna l  and 
d o m e s t i c  e c on om ic  e nv i ro n m e n t  - not least  the g row in g  real i ty  that  a 
B a n k /F u n d  a pp ro v e d  SAP has meant  m o re  reso u rce  t rans fe rs ,  and its a b ­
sence  less.  That  is ne i the r  an e n d o rs e m e n t  n o r  a c ond em n a t ion  of SAP 
c o n te n ts  - a rea l is t ic  f inanc ia l  m o b i l i z e r  r e s p o n d s  both ve rba l l y  and in p rac ­
t ice  to f u n d e r  pre fe rences.  A despe ra te  one, in fact, has l i t t le choice.  In a 
m a jo r i t y  of cases,  g ross ove r -va lua t ion  of c u r re n c ies  has been reduced  or  
e l im in a te d  (m easu red  in co m p a ra t ive  pr ice m ovem ents ) .  The rem a in ing  
la rg e  b lock  of excep t ions  are - i r on ica l l y  - those  of the Franc Zone.  Of ficial  
a g r i c u l tu ra l  po l icy  re la t ing  to p r ic ing  and m a rke t ing  has become more  market  
a nd  g ro w e r - f r i e n d l y  a l t ho ugh  its im pac t  on n on -expo r t  p roduc t ion  re m a in s  
s o m e w h a t  pe r iphera l .  On the o th e r  hand,  w ag e  and s a la ry -po l ic y  has - if 
a n y th in g  - become worse  w i th  most  s t ruc tu res ,  e i the r  much too h igh re la t ive 
to GDP (e.g. Cote d ' I vo i re ,  B u rk ina  Faso,  Nam ib ia  and ,  at least at sa la ry  level ,  
Z a m b ia  and South Af r ica)  o r  m uch  too  low abso lu te ly  (e.g. Tanzan ia.  
S o m a l ia ,  Mozam b ique ) .
On ba lance ,  it is correct  to ag ree  w i th  those  w ho  conc lude  that  most  SSA 
c o u n t r i e s  o v e r  1986-90 m oved  to w a rd  s ign i f ican t ly  more  app rop r ia te  e co ­
n o m ic  po l ic ies  and ev idenced  co n s ide ra b le  w i l l i n g n e ss  to accept  t rans i t i ona l  
cos ts  w h ich  were  (and are)  severe  in pol i t i ca l  and social ,  as well  as eco ­
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nom ic ,  te rms .  By the same token,  it is not  u n r e a s o n a b le  f o r  them  to feel 
sh o r t - cha n ge d  w hen  - la rge ly  because  of a id and t r a d e  shor t fa l l s  - they  have 
fa i led  to ach ieve  an t ic ipa ted  resul ts.
Tnat  is, i ron ica l l y ,  of p a r t i c u la r  conce rn  to g o v e r n m e n ts  e i th e r  p rac t i s ing  or 
c o n s id e r in g  m o v in g  to re la t i ve ly  open po l i t i ca l  sys tem s .  Vo te rs  do not ap ­
p rec ia te  sus ta ined  e c o n o m ic  fa i lu re  o r  s tagna t ion  as m e a s u r e d  by th e i r  own 
access  to p r i va te  c o n s u m p t io n  and pub l i c  se rv ices .  O p p o s i t i o n s ,  u n d e r  such 
c i r cu m s ta n ce s ,  a re  tac t ica l l y  wel l  a dv ised  to run  on ca rgo  cul t  popu l i s t  p lat ­
f o r m s  (m ore  pro f i ts  - h ig h e r  real wages  - less im p o r t  re s t r i c t i o n s  - lo w e r  taxes 
- h ig h e r  g r o w e r  and lo w e r  c o n s u m e r  food  p r ice s  - c u r re n c y  reva luat ion)  
w h ic h  do at t ract  vo te rs  but  are  ra the r  hard  to p e rce ive  as le a d in g  e i ther  to 
s ens ib le  (or  even p rac t icab le )  e conom ic  po l i c ies  or.  f o r  tha t  mat ter ,  to 
s u s ta in a b i l i t y  of pol i t ica l  o pe n ne ss  af te r  the new  g o v e r n m e n t  takes off ice.
To state the  abo ve  is not  to appea l  fo r  r e c r im in a t io n .  The past  is past and 
has shape d  the present .  What  can use fu l l y  be l e a r n e d  f ro m  the  fa i lu re  - and  
no m i l d e r  t e rm  is a p p r o p r i a t e  - o f  UNPAAERD is w h a t  m ig h t  work ,  what  to 
a v o id  a n d  w h a t  to r e v e r s e  in the 1990s.
Does A f r ica  Have  An E c on o m ic  Fu ture?
The e c o n o m ic  reco rd  of A f r i ca  (SSA. North  A f r i ca ,  RSA al ike)  in the  1980s has 
been d ism a l  in respec t  to g row th ,  ex te rna l  ba lance ,  p o v e r t y  and  food secu­
r i ty. The best  that  can be said is that  most  A f r i c a n s  and  m os t  economies  
have s u rv ive d  and.  fo r  a m a jo r i t y  of e c o n o m ie s  (but  p r o b a b ly  not  fo r  a ma­
jo r i t y  of  A fr icans) ,  the la t te r  hal f  of the 1980s saw  a c la w in g  back to 
s tab i l isa t io n ,  par t ia l  r e co ve ry  and  a d ju s tm e n t  and  - p e r h a p s  - renewed 
g ro w th  of ou tput  per  head.
But  it is u n rea so n a b le  to p ro jec t  the  1980s into the  1990s. Fi rst ,  o v e r  1965-72 
and  1976-79, most  A f r i ca n  e con o m ie s  we re  g r o w in g  in pe r  capi ta terms. 
Second,  in the la t te r  hal f  of the  1980s, m an y  r e g a in e d  tha t  pos i t ion ,even  if 
t en u ou s ly ,  and w i th  great  vu ln e ra b i l i t y  to e x o g e n o u s  shocks  (e.g. the  - lucki ly 
b r ie f  - post  I raq occupa t ion  of Kuw a i t  oi l  p r ice  e xp los io n ) .
But  two  m o re  fac to rs  m ay  be m o re  cruc ia l .  On each  of  the  su b - th e m e s  cov­
e red,  a g r o w in g  bo d y  o f  a g r e e m e n t  on d i re c t io n  a n d  on p r a c t i c a l  f i r s t  steps  
n ow  ex is ts  and is be ing  ac ted on by o v e r  ha l f  of  A f r i ca n  States  and  donor  
agenc ies .  The q ues t ions  are  of a r t icu la t io n ,  s e qu e nce ,  se con d  steps and 
v o lu m e  of resources  nee ded  w i th  the f requen t  d e a d lo c k s  of the  1980s app a r ­
ent ly  in c re as ing ly  b reak in g  up. Second,  in m os t  cases  p os i t i ve  innova t ions 
w i th  p ro m is in g  in i t ia l  resu l t s  can be seen,  e.g. in s e cu r i t y  nets in Botswana 
and  p e rha ps  M o z a m b iq u e ,  in smal l  f a r m e r  s u p p o r t  and  e n a b le m e n t ,  e.g. via 
IFAD, som e  NGO p ro jec ts  and som e na t io na l  p r o g r a m m e s ,  in effect ive
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A f r ica n -b a se d ,  s m a l l - fa rm er  o r ien ted  a g r icu l tu ra l  research  in Z im b a b w e  and 
K en y a  nat iona l ly ,  the Sou the rn  A f r i can  D e ve lopm e n t  C o o rd ina t ion  C o n fe r ­
ence  (SADCC) reg iona l l y  and the In te rna t iona l  Centre  for  Insect  Patho logy  
and  E n v i ro nm e n t  cont inenta l l y ;  in expo r t  d ive rs i f ica t ion  in M aur i t ius  and 
Z im b a b w e ;  in im ag in a t ive  reg iona l  d e v e lo p m e n t  coo rd in a t ion  in i t ia t ives  by 
S A D C C  and the ove r lapp in g  Pre ferent ia l  T rade  A re a  of Eastern and Sou thern  
A fr ica .
The 1990s are not  assured  of be ing a decade  of renewed  econom ic  p rog ress  
f o r  A f r i ca .  The posi t ive  s igns are  too par t ia l ,  ten ta t i ve  and f ragi le  fo r  that  and 
the  ex te rna l  e n v i ro n m e n t  sti l l  too uncer ta in  and even menac ing .
But  peace  cou ld  ra ise GDP g row th  by hal f  a per  cent  o r  even a who le  per  cent 
on ave rage :  bet te r  t rade  d ev e lo p m en t  a n o th e r  hal f  per  cent; ag r icu l tu ra l  and 
p o v e r t y  re duc t io n  ( inc lud ing  enab l ing  w o m e n )  one per cent; m anu fac tu r ing  
and  in f ra s t ruc tu re  rehab i l i ta t ion  and d e v e lo p m e n t  perhaps  as much;  more  
ac c o u n ta b le ,  ef f icient and p a r t i c ipa to ry  g o v e rn a nc e  at least  hal f  a per  cent: 
re s t ru c tu r i n g  ODA. to enab le  ra the r  than subs t i tu te  fo r  A fr ican capaci ty ,  at 
least  hal f  a p e r  cent. The to ta l  p o te n t i a l  ga in  is 4-4.5 % , wh ich ,  if fu l ly  rea l ised 
(u n l i ke ly  fo r  all count r ies) ,  w ou ld  b r ing  A f r i ca 's  g row th  to, o r  above,  7 %  a 
y e a r  and  on h a l f  a c h ie v e m e n t  (qu i te  p oss ib le )  w o u ld  ra ise  a nn u a l  c o n t i ­
n e n t a l  GDP g ro w th  to 5% .  That  w o u ld  re s to re  a f o r w a r d  d y n a m ic  and e n a ­
b le  m o s t  A f r i c a n s  to be b e t t e r  o f f  in 2000 than in 1990.
Sou th  A f r i can  econom ic  rev iva l  has - a lo ng  w i th  South Af r ica - now moved  
onto  the  SSA agenda but cannot  read i l y  be dated.  1990 and 1991 wi l l  be 
ye a rs  of nega t i ve  GDP growth .  S ign i f ican t  rev iva l  is un l i ke ly  unti l  a c lear  
p ro c e s s  of peaceful  t rans i t ion  to stable g o v e rn a nc e  is well  advanced  - fo r  
re a s o n s  of dom es t ic  and ex te rna l  en te rp r ise  co n f id ence  am ong  others.  The 
need to inc rease  human inves tm en t  and basic serv ices,  reduce  abso lu te  
p ov e r ty ,  inc rease  e m p loym en t ,  lessen e thn ica l l y  l inked inequa l i t y ,  enhance 
la b o u r  p ro du c t iv i t y  and res t ruc tu re  p ro d u c t io n  are by no means  w ho l ly  c o m ­
pa t ib le  in resource  a l loca t ion  te rm s ,  unless an 8 %  GDP growth  rate was to 
be a ch ieve d ,  wh ich  appears  most  un l i ke ly .  Reg iona l  e conom ic  re la t ions  wi l l  
a lso  pose  p rob le m s .  The old o v e r p r i c e d  m an u fa c tu res  fo r  m ig ran t  la bou r  
base canno t  be res tored - if on ly  because  the  'n e w '  RSA wi l l  phase out 
m ig r a n t  w o rk e rs  to reduce  nat iona l  u ne m p lo y m e n t .  Its 1980s va r ian t  of 
h o ld in g  marke ts  capt ive  by w re c k in g  a l te rna t ive  t ra nspo r t  routes to ra ise ex­
po r ts  w o u ld  be even less rev ivab le .  A new, less unba lanced ,  m ore  even- 
h a n d e d  t ra d e  package in go o d s  and se rv ices  that  a lso helps ach ieve  buoyant  
Sou th  A f r i can  export  g ro w th  m ay  not  be eas i l y  o r  rap id ly  at ta inab le ,  espe ­
c ia l l y  because  ne i ther  the  b lack  pol i t ica l  and in te l lectual  co u n te r ­
e s ta b l i s h m e n t ,  nor  the wh i te  bus iness  le a de rsh ip  seem to have g rasped  the 
sco pe  and  dep th  of the cha l lenge.
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Thus,  the  v is ion  of the South  A f r ican  e c o n o m y  as a l o c o m o t i v e ,  e i ther  pul l ing 
Sou th e rn  A f r ica  out  of rece ss ion  or  ro l l ing  o v e r  its e c o n o m ie s  l ike stal led 
lo r r ies  on a c ross ing ,  is unrea l .  The least  u n l ike ly  p ro je c t io n s  wou ld  be of 
1-3% annua l  g ro w th  o v e r  the  years  to 1995 w i th  a 6 %  ta rge t  fo r  2000 if both 
t ra n s i t i o n  in g o v e rn a n c e  and a t ta in m e n t  of w o rk in g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and export  
s t ra teg ie s  com e  off by - say - 1995.
Even such ten ta t i ve  o p t im is m  abou t  A f r i ca 's  e c o n o m ic  p ro spec ts  is open to 
doub t .  But  A f r i cans  and  those  c o m m i t te d  to w o rk in g  w i th  th e m  have no other  
op t ion  - a re -run  of the 1980s is too  te r r ib le  to accep t  as a basis fo r  act ion. 
In 1991, it is necessa ry  to d r a w  s o m e  com fo r t  f r o m  the  o ld es t  re co rd ed  piece 
of E u ropean  A f r ican  stud ies :  P l iny 's  2000-year -o ld  w a rn in g .  "Out  of Afr ica
the re  is a lways  s o m e th in g  new".
An In te rn a t ion a !  A f r i can  A g e n d a  fo r  the  1990s?
The re co rd  of the 1980s, and of  UN P A A ER D  in p a r t i cu la r ,  is lamentab le .  But 
to lam en t  - sti l l  less to re c r im in a te  - wi l l  not by i tse l f  m ake  the  1990s better. 
N o r  wi l l  cons t ruc t ing  new schem es  on a 'b u s in e ss  as b e fo re '  basis.  Both SSA 
and its c o o p e ra t i n g  pa r tn e rs  need to ident i f y  a p ra c t i c ab le  'c on t rac t '  for  
1992-96 and d e l i v e r  on it. 'C o n t ra c t '  because  w h a t  one  is rea l l y  ta lk ing  about  
is a co m p a c t  backed by c o m m o n  ob jec t ives,  a g re e d  m e ans ,  o rd e rs  of m a g ­
n i tudes  and m ora l  pe rsua s io n .  That  p rocess  wi l l  need  to accep t  that there 
wi l l  be no m a ss ive  im p ro v e m e n t  in c o m m o d i t y  t e r m s  of t ra d e  o r  c l imate  and 
that  Cen tra l  and Eastern European,  and  p ro b a b ly  M id d le  Eastern,  cal ls on 
soft f inance  mean  that p laus ib le  ta rge ts  fo r  new  re s o u r c e  t ra ns fe rs  to SSA are 
un l i ke ly  to a l lo w  fo r  m o re  than 4 %  annua l  real  g ro w th  (1%  pe r  capi ta)  con ­
cen t ra ted  on a handfu l  of coun t r ie s  re c o ns t ru c t in g  a f te r  w a r  o r  ' c o m in g  in out 
of the  c o ld '  a f te r  c o n s t ru c t in g /s u s ta in in g  c re d ib l e  e c o n o m ic  st rategies.  
There fo re ,  a s im p le  p re s c r ip t io n  of 'm o re  a id '  (in a n y  case of doub t fu l  effi­
cacy)  is not p rac t i cab le .  N o r  can ' r ev ive  the C o m m o n  F u n d '  be a ve ry  useful 
p ro posa l  in respec t  of te rm s  of t rade  (or, at least,  not  the  Fi rs t  W indow) .
A shor t  l ist of poss ib le  a venues  tow a rd  p r o g r a m m e  o r  c o m p a c t  components  
inc ludes :
(1) N e w  re so u rce  t ra ns fe rs  - o th e r  than  techn ica l  a s s is ta n ce  - r i s ing  5%  a 
year ,  and  techn ica l  ass is tance  2 %  - a v e r a g e  a b o u t  4 %  There  are. in 
abso lu te  n um be rs ,  too m a n y  techn ica l  a s s is ta n ce  and  o pe ra t iona l  gap- 
f i l l i ng  p e rson ne l  in SSA now  - of f icial  and NGO al ike .  T h e re  are  too many 
high cost  ove rsea s  s tudy  p r o g r a m m e s  and  ' s tu d y  to u r s '  f o r  wh ich  a more 
a p p ro p r ia te  ad jec t i ve  m ig h t  be 'p ackag e ' .  M o re  se le c t i v i t y  on personnel  
(and c le a re r  d i f fe ren t ia t ion  be tween gap - f i l l in g  o p e ra t io n a l  and technical 
ass is tance  p roper ) ,  m o re  su ppo r t  fo r  jo in t  v e n tu re s  based  at Af r ican in­
s t i t u t ions  ( inc lud ing  d om es t i c  NGOs). in s t i t u t io n a l  s u p p o r t  (especia l ly  in
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respec t  of research  and t ra in ing) ,  se lec t ive  use of co un te rpa r t  funds  to 
f inance  real pub l ic  se rvant  pay inc reases  l inked to pe r fo rm ance  in ce n ­
t ives  and to reduce  leakage are needed - some as t rans fe rs  w i th in  TA, 
s o m e  as shif ts f rom TA to 'b udg e t  su pp o r t '  o r  'cap i ta l ' ,  a lbei t  in all poo r  
coun t r ie s ,  the lat ter  two need to be b lended.
(2) Rad ica l  deb t  w r i te d o w n .  Up to 100% of g o v e rn m e n t - to -g o v e rnm en t  debt 
to lo w - inco m e  deb t -d is t ressed ;  up to 50%  (a la Poland-Egypt)  to m idd le -  
in c o m e  deb t -d is t ressed .  Paral le l  ac t ion on co m m e rc ia l  bank debt  (buy ­
ing it in via the Wor ld  Bank  o r  o the r  p r o g r a m m e s  at second a ry  market ,  
i.e. 5 %  to 3 5 %  or  below).  Sys temat ic  conve rs ion  of IMF d ra w in gs  to 
ESAF to hai t  the 1980s $3 b i l l i on  A f r i can  ( inc lud ing  RSA) ou t f low to the 
Fund.  G re a te r  Bank  c o nv e rs io n  of Bank loans  to IDA cred i ts  (howeve r  
m a n ag e d )  fo r  p resent  IDA-e l ig ib le  coun t r ie s  (p robab ly  in c lud ing  Niger ia)  
pa ra l le led  by g rea te r  ex te rna l  m e m b e r  fund ing  of the A D B 's  A f r i can  De­
v e lo p m e n t  Fund.  The N e the r la n d s '  p roposa ls  and those  of the North-  
Sou th  R ound tab le  on A f r ican  Debt  Relief,  Re co very  and De m ocracy  held 
in A b id ja n  in Ju ly 1991 both p ro v ide  a sound  basis fo r  a r t icu la t ing  an 
ag ree d  p ro g r a m m e  and sugges t  that one may,  at last, be w i th in  reach, if 
not  in 1992 then before 1995. If wa iv ing  in terest  and f reez ing  repaym ent  
now, and w r i t i ng  off p r inc ipa l  g radua l ly ,  wi l l  ease the negot ia t ion ,  they 
are  wo r th  exp lo r ing .
(3) D ive rs i f i ed  expo r ts  v ia se r ious  A f r i can  p r io r i t y  at ten t ion  backed by g lobal  
techn ica l  assistance support ,  fo r  s tud ies and  capi ta l  ass is tance ( inc lud ing  
gua ran te es  to en te rp r ise  inves to rs  in the - p ro bab ly  n um erous  - cases in 
w h ich  a jo int  ven tu re  is the a p p ro p r ia te  fo rm)  fo r  m ov ing  f rom  study ing  
to expo r t in g .  The Second W in d o w  of the C o m m o n  Fund can play a useful 
ro le  but  wou ld  be s t reng thened  were  e l ig ib i l i t y  fo r  f inance  b road ene d  to 
in c lu d e  reg iona l ,  p ro d u c e r -c o u n t ry  g ro u p s  and reg iona l  t rade  and d e ­
v e lo p m e n t  o rgan iza t ions .
(4) R e v ie w in g  w h a t  can be done  abou t  c o m m o d i t ie s ,  inc lud ing  more  effec­
t ive  se l l ing  (domest i c  ac t ions?  Join t  ve n tu re s  o r  dom es t ic  export  c o m ­
pan ies?  Contrac ts  wi th  non - t rad i t io na l ,  espec ia l l y  Sou thern ,  marke ts? 
Enfo rced  an t i - co l l us ion  legis la t ion?),  p re -expo r t  p rocessing ,  crea t ion  of a 
g lo ba l  va r ian t  of Stabex co ve r ing  v is ib le  and  inv is ib le  raw and processed 
c o m m o d i t y  ( in c lud ing  tou r i sm )  exports .  The C o m m o n  Fund First  W in d o w  
and  s tan da rd  s tab i l isa t ion  a g reem e n ts  a re  (w ha tever t he i r  mer i ts)  not 
p ra c t i cab le  areas of a g reem en t  at th is  t ime.  The i tems ci ted m igh t  be, 
a l t h o u g h  the ques t ion  of who  is to fund a g loba l  Stabex if p r ices  do not 
r e c o v e r  wi l l  pose p rob lems.
(5) A t te n t io n  to the  a pp a re n t  g ross  o ve r -p r ic in g  of  im po r ts  into SSA. Ini ­
t ia l l y ,  research  on pa ram ete rs  and causes is needed  but c lear ly  wi th  a 
v ie w  to act ion  once the causes are ident i f ied .  Encourag ing  com pet i t ion
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a m o n g  g loba l  t ra d in g  f i rm s  a n d / o r  c rea t ing  d o m e s t i c  (pub l ic  o r  pr ivate) 
jo in t  ven tu re s  w i th  them  w o u ld  a p p e a r  to be an op t io n  w o r th  cons ider ing .  
N e i th e r  p resen t  fo rm s  of p r ice  s u rve i l lan ce  n o r  c o m p e t i t i v e  tend e r ing ,  by 
the m se lve s ,  seem able  to reach to the  heart  of the  p ro b le m .
(6) P roduc t iv i t y  bu i ld ing  - in c lud ing ,  but  go ing  b eyon d ,  t r a in in g  to cover  o r ­
gan iza t io n  (not  least m o re  effect ive and m e m b e r - r e s p o n s iv e  w o r k e r  sel f­
o rg an iza t ion ) ,  m a n a g e m e n t  and incen t ives .  Th is is ra re ly  a specif ic 
p r io r i t y  but  is crucia l  if uni t  la b o u r  costs,  not  just  real  wages ,  are to be 
red uce d .  Because  it is a new area,  techn ica l  a ss is tan ce  wi l l  be needed 
and ,  perhaps ,  useful .  R ed uc ing  overs ta f f in g  m a y  of ten be an e lement 
( p re fe rab ly  by ra is ing  capac i t y  u t i l i sa t ion  to jus t i f y  leve ls  re la ted  to two- 
th ree  shif t  o pe ra t io ns )  but  is not  an a d e q u a te  m e d iu m - te r m  p rog ram m e.  
Here, TA cou ld  in c lu de  Nor th - f in anced  re se a rch  and  co nsu l ta n cy  f rom 
A f r i ca n  and o th e r  Sou th e rn  e n te rp r ises  w h ich  have  a ch ieve d  acceptab le  
and  r is ing  la b ou r  p ro d u c t iv i t y .  Ou ts id e  (or  even  w i th in )  the  fo rm a l  wage 
sectors ,  a p p ro a c he s  need to be based on b ro a d  s u rv e y s  of what  actual,  
r e m o v a b le  obs tac les  are  - e.g. the t im e  w o m e n  m us t  spend  fe tch ing  w a ­
te r  as a b a r r ie r  to in c reased  l a b o u r  input  on fa m i l y  f a rm s  at peak sea­
sons ,  o r  lack of pub l i c  t ra n s p o r t / b i c y c le s  as a b a r r i e r  to a r r i v i n g  on the 
job  on t im e  and res ted .
(7) C a pac i ty  b u i ld ing  - research  and t ra in ing ,  g o v e r n m e n t  ( in c lu d ing  local 
g ov e rn m e n t ) ,  en te rp r ises ,  d om es t i c  (A f r ican) NGOs. Here  the  top  pr io r i t y  
is fo r  sys tem at ic  A f r i ca n  p ropo sa ls  - and fo r  less g r a n d io s e ,  's i l v e r  bul let '  
shor t - l i s ts  f ro m  ex te rna l  sources .  A n o th e r  p r i o r i t y  is to avo id  Northern  
fash ions  or, indeed,  a p p ro a c h e s  w h ich  m a y  be so u n d  in the  North  but are 
qu i te  u nso u nd  in the  A f r ican  contex t .  Fo r  e x am p le ,  W e b e r ia n  bureauc­
racy does  hand le  most  g o v e rn m e n t  tasks we l l  and  m os t  pos t-W eber ian  
c r i t iqu es  ac tua l l y  a ssum e  a fun c t io n in g  b u r e a u c r a c y  in o r d e r  to concen ­
t ra te  on the tasks be t te r  h an d le d  by o th e r  a p p ro a c h e s  a n d / o r  needing 
g re a te r  b u reauc ra t i c  f le x ib i l i t y ,  in c lu d in g  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n .  In SSA. the 
most  im m ed ia te  p ro b le m  is of ten lack of a fu n c t io n in g  b u re a u c ra t i c  sys­
tem, wh ich  fo rces  rou t ine  tasks to be h a n d le d  on a one -o f f  judgementa l  
basis.  S im i la r ly ,  a d m in i s t r a to rs ,  f ro m  s e n i o r  c le r ica l  t h r o u g h  middle 
p ro fess io na l  levels,  are usua l l y  too  few - ra th e r  than  too  n u m e r o u s  - in 
en te rp r ise s ,  d om es t i c  NGOs and g o v e rn m e n t .  Th is is not  to denigrate 
se lec t i ve  use of key pos t -b u reauc ra t ic ,  p a r t i c i p a to r y  t oo ls  - e.g. Rapid 
Rura l  A p p ra is a l  - but  to w a rn  that  a f u n c t io n in g  b u r e a u c ra t i c  sys tem run 
by a de q ua te  n u m b e rs  of c o m p e te n t  a d m in i s t r a t o r s  is a goa l  to be 
ach ieved  in most  of SSA, not  an ex is t ing  m o n s te r  to be a t tacked.
(8) Im p ro v in g  a ccou n ts  in t e rm s  of accu racy ,  t im e l in e s s ,  in fo rm a t io n  pro­
v id e d  and access ib i l i t y .  Aga in ,  NGOs and  e n te rp r i s e s  f re que n t ly  have 
w ea kne sse s  as se r io us  as those  of g o v e rn m e n ts .  W itho u t  a c c o u n ts , ac­
c o u n ta b i l i t y  (in the b road es t  sense  as we l l  as the  n a r r o w e r  senses) is
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s im p ly  no t  possib le .  The co n t r ibu t io n  of the g loba l  c om m un i t y  to date is. 
on balance,  negat ive.  D e m a n d in g  a p le tho ra  of separa te  p ro ced u re s  fo r  
ex te rna l  resource  rep o r t ing  necess i ta tes  rea l loca t ion  of scarce pe rsonne l  
and  both m arg ina l i ses  and  decapac i ta tes  nat ional  systems. If exte rna l  
d o n o r s  p rov ided  TA fo r  nat iona l  (or  e n te rp r ise  or  dom es t ic  NGO) account  
s y s tem  ove rha u l  and fo r  th i rd  coun t ry  (e.g. South Asia,  Ph i l ipp ines,  
Egyp t)  gap-f i l l ing  personne l  and fo r  s t reng th en in g  nat ional  t ra in ing  on a 
l a r g e r  scale than here to fo re ,  that  w ou ld  be a start. Beyond  that they 
need  to accept  repor ts  bas ica l l y  on the nat ional  accoun t ing  fo rm a t  (pos­
s ib ly  w i th  some l im i ted  a d d e d  data)  and do the recast ing  into the i r  own 
na t io na l  o r  ins t i tu t ional  accoun t ing  fo rm a ts  themse lves .
(9) C iv i l  soc ie ty  s t reng th en in g  (in a sense so m e w he re  be tween its 
G ra m s c ia n  o r ig ins  and its neo- l ibe ra l ,  co d e -w o rd  mean ings)  is in c re as ­
ing ly  d e m a n d e d  in A fr i ca  and by dono rs .  But  there  has been l i t t le d i s ­
c u s s io n  of how any ex te rna l  co n t r ib u t io n  migh t  be a r t icu la ted  and 
p r o g r a m m e d .  On the face of it, the  f oca l  p o in t  sh ou ld  be do m e s t i c  NGOs  
( t rade  union,  a r t isana l ,  peasant ,  re l ig ious ,  w o m e n 's ,  youth ,  
n e ig h b o u rh o o d ) .  The p re sence  of scores  of ex terna l  NGOs wi th budgets,  
off ices,  personne l ,  p r o g r a m m e s  and pro jec ts  does  not, in many cases,  
fac i l i ta te  and capac i tate do m e s t i c  NGOs o r  local g ove rnm en t .  Ra ther it 
m a rg in a l i se s ,  decapaci ta tes.  beggar is es  and re tards  them.  One s t ru c ­
tu ra l  shif t  w o u ld  be to ins is t  that,  except  u n d e r  specia l  c i r cumstances ,  
e x te rna l  NGOs shou ld  opera te  in jo int  ven tu re s  with, o r  by, exte rna l  
s u p p o r t  channe led  to, o r  th ro u g h ,  dom es t ic  NGOs. That  wou ld  be a n a l ­
o g o u s  to most  b i la tera l  g ov e rn m e n t - to -g o v e r n m e n t  channe l ing .  Once 
tha t  was ach ieved ,  unqua l i f ied  suppo r t  fo r  more  fund ing  via exte rnal  
NGOs ( rea l is t ica l ly  to a subs tant ia l  ex tent  ma tch ing  o r  topp in g  up ex­
te rn a l  go ve rn m e n ta l  f inance) w ou ld  be app ro p r ia te .  Where  accep tab le  
(wh ich  is inc reas ing ly  often),  externa!  techn ica l  assistance on vo te r  re g ­
i s t ra t ion  and cam pa ig n  ru les,  p lus jo int  e x te rn a l -do m es t ic  NGO elect ion  
o b s e rv a t io n  teams,  could  a lso be useful .
(10) P ove r ty  - m o re  accura te ly  poverty ,  and espec ia l l y  abso lu te  poverty,  r e ­
d u c t io n  - is a st ra teg ic  p r io r i t y  v e rba l l y  in most  (not all) of A f r i ca  and 
g lo ba l l y .  But  A fr i can States sti l l  need to a r t icu la te  and to p ro g r a m m e  it 
w i t h in  t h e i r  centra l  bu d g e ta ry  a l loca t io ns  of f inance,  fo re ign  exchange  
and  pe rsonne l ,  and ex te rna l  bod ie s  to p ro v id e  com para t ive  inputs (and 
e x p e r ie n c e d  TA personne l)  wh i le  accep t ing  that  A f r i cans  - not least  p oo r  
A f r i c a n s  - know  ra ther  m o re  abou t  the  nuts and bol ts  of th is  top ic  than 
t h e y  the m se lve s  usua l ly  do.  In par t i cu la r ,  m ore  p ro d u c t io n /p ro d u c t i v i t y  
by p o o r  peop le  needs se r io us  a t ten t ion  beyond  - though  in c lu d ing  - 
l a b o u r  in tens ive  cons t ruc t ion  w o rks  (publ ic  and - e.g. hous ing  - pr iva te)  
a nd  fam i ly  fa rm e r  enab l ing  p ro g ra m m e s .  The issue is no t  so m u c h  tha t  
o f  m o r e  f in ance  as it is o f  re s t ru c tu r i n g  p r o g r a m m e s ,  p e r s o n n e l  a l l o ­
ca t ions ,  b u d g e ts  and  - a b o v e  a l l  - out look,  to m ake  p ove r ty  r e d uc t io n  an
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i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  m a in  l ine  o p e ra t i o n s  a nd  c r i t e r i a - s e t t i n g  r a t h e r  than a 
se r ies  o f  m a r g i n a l  add -ons .  The A f r i can  s ide  m ay  also need assurance  
that  abso lu te  pove r ty  r e d u c t i o n /h u m a n  co n d i t i o n /h u m a n  
in v e s tm en t /s oc ia l  d im e n s io n s  (h o w eve r  t i t led)  wi l l  r e m a in  on the North 's  
a ge n d a  and  not  van ish  w i th  i l l - concea led  re t ro s p e c t i v e  d e r is io n  as did 
R o be r t  M a c N a m a ra 's  'A b s o lu te  Poverty  E ra d ica t io n '  and  ILO 's  Basic 
N e e d s '  app ro a che s .
(11) G e n d e r  - l ike p ove r ty  - is an area  in w h ich  g r o w in g  a ccep tance  of the 
p r io r i t y  na tu re  of the  issue c lus te r  has of ten left a d v o c a te s  w i thou t  p ro ­
posed  a r t i c u la t io n s  and ac t ions  to of fe r  the  n ew ly  c o n v e r te d ,  and is also 
one  in w h ich  con tex tua l i t ie s  and p r io r i t ie s  need to be set by Afr ican 
w o m e n  wi th  less a t tem p ts  at N o r the rn  'g u id a n c e ' .  C le a r l y  there  is an 
o v e r la p  w i th  c iv i l  so c ie ty  (half  of its m e m b e rs  are  w o m e n ) ,  w i th  pove r ty  
(a m a jo r i t y  of h ou s e ho ld s  in abso lu te  po ve r ty  a re  fem a le -he a de d ) ,  with 
p o p u la t i o n  (m ore  female  e d u ca t ion  is h is to r ica l l y  a v e ry  ef fect ive  means 
of r e d u c in g  both infant  m o r ta l i t y  and r e p r o d u c t i o n  rates)  and  wi th food  
se c u r i t y  (in SSA 's  d iv id e d  hou se ho ld  budg e t  sys tem s ,  food  is p r im ar i ly  
a fem a le  re s p o n s ib i l i t y  and abou t  tw o - th i rd s  to t h r e e -q u a r te r s  of Afr ican 
food  is g ro w n  p r im a r i l y  by wo m e n) .  Less e v id e n t  is the  ove r lap  with 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . M a ny  - p ro b a b ly  most  - SSA w o m e n  w o r k  v e ry  long hours.  
If they  are to p ro du c e  m ore ,  to a t tend m o re  e d u c a t i o n  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  and 
to pa r t i c ipa te  m o re  fu l l y  in c iv i l  soc iety ,  they  need to have  hours  f reed 
f ro m  p resen t  tasks.  The w ays  to do th is  a re  not  se l f -ev iden t  but are 
usua l l y  c o n te x tua l l y  iden t i f iab le ;  fo r  e xa m p le ,  f e tch in g  w a te r  and fuel 
and  ca r in g  f o r  the s ick of ten takes 6-8 h ou rs  a d ay  of ru ra l  w o m e n 's  (and 
g i r l s ' )  t ime.  A ccess ib le  ru ra l  wa te r ,  fu n c t io n in g  p r im a r y  hea l th  care, v i l ­
lage  o r  h o u s e h o ld  s i l v i c u l tu re  could  of ten cut  th is  d o w n  to 2-3. With the 
f reed  h ou rs  m o re  c rops  cou ld  be p ro d u c e d  - o r  cash ea rn e d ,  e.g. f rom 
la b o u r  in tens ive  w o rk  e m p lo y m e n t  - even if no im m e d ia te  b reak th roughs  
on a g r i c u l tu ra l  p ro d u c t i v i t y  w e re  ava i lab le .
(12) E m e rg e n c y  (ca lam i ty )  a id - in som e  years  up to 2 5 %  of  to ta l  t rans fe rs  to 
SSA - needs  s t ruc tu ra l  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  in tw o  d i re c t io n s .  First to 
r e c o g n is e  th a t  c a la m i t i e s  w i l l  r e c u r  in a n y  c o u n t r y  a n d  s o m e  wi l l  occur  
in a n y  y e a r  in A f r i ca  as a who le .  T here fo re ,  a lo n g - te rm  st ra teg ic ap­
p ro ach  w i th  f u n d in g  and  ins t i tu t iona l  i n f ra s t r u c tu re  in pface - not  repet i ­
t ive  one -o f fe ry  - is needed .  The G7 p ro p o s a ls  f o r  a spec ia l  UN strategic 
uni t  to be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  iden t i f ica t ion ,  m o b i l i s a t io n ,  c o o r d in a t i o n  and - 
w h e re  n ece ssa ry  - spec ia l  p r o g r a m m e  o p e ra t io n a l  le ade rsh ip ,  does 
re co gn ise  the  p ro b le m  and go b ro a d ly  in the  r igh t  d i re c t io n ,  especia l ly  if 
p a ra l le led  by c o m p a r a b le  b i la te ra l  a id a g e n c y  and  A f r i c a n  nat ional  units.
The ob jec t ion s  of co n c e rn e d  agenc ie s  (UNDRO, UNH CR,  UNDP) are val id 
to the ex ten t  that  any  new  a r ra n g e m e n t  s h o u ld  not  take  o v e r  the opera ­
t iona l  w o rk  of the  f i rst  two  and  shou ld  u t i l i se  the  of f i ces of the UNDP
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Res iden t  Represen ta t ives  w h e re  pract i ca l .  But  Afr ican em ergen c ie s  d e ­
m an d  vast ly  im p ro ve d  capaci t ies ,  co o rd in a t io n  m echan isms and s t ra te ­
g ic v is ion .  The ' i n te r fe ren ce '  c r i t ique  is a lso of mixed va l id i t y  - the 
re co rd  is one of too much  caut ion  in s u pp ly in g  surv ival  ass is tance  on 
bo th  s ides of  conf l ic t  l ines,  but  a lso of too  much di rect  i n te rven t ion  in 
deta i ls ,  and even p ro g r a m m e  size and pr io r i t ies,  of m a jo r  e m e rg en c y  
ope ra t ions .  Na t iona l ly  in Afr ica ,  B o tsw ana  has a permanen t  p ro g r a m m e  
co re  wi th  inst i tu t ional  in f ras truc tu re ,  p ro ce d u re s  and - in pract i ce  - some 
p r o g r a m m e s  every  y e a r  so that  it is in good  runn ing  o rd e r  shou ld  m a s ­
s ive  need ar ise. Indeed  no g loba l ,  N o r the rn  or  o the r  A fr i can st ra teg ic  
ap p ro a c h  is c o m parab le  in co ve rag e  and qual i ty .
Second,  s t ra teg ic p la nn ing  to conver t  su rv iva l  re l ie f  a im ed  at the 
ca la m i ty  of w a r  to rehab i l i ta t io n  (of l i ve l i hoods ,  e.g. t ranspo r t  home,  
s e ed s / too ls / foo d  unti l  harves t ,  of local basic serv ices and in f ras truc tu re ,  
of  marke t  access)  as secur i t y  im proves ,  is a p r io r i t y .  The scale on wh ich  
th is  is now  needed in M o za m b iq u e ,  Eri trea, Ango la ,  Eth iopia and 
Som a l ia ,  dwarfs  any past  exerc ises .  Both  des ign  and fund in g  are p a r ­
t i c u la r l y  weak  - na t io na l ly  and ,  even more ,  by Northern  States and in te r ­
na t iona l  agencies  - fo r  do m e s t ic  d is loca ted ,  o r  p aup er ised - in -hom e-a reas  
p e rsons  ra the r  than fo r  t r a n s b o r d e r  re fugees .  UNHCR has bet te r  recent  
rehab i l i ta t ion  exper ience ,  but  based on sco res of thousands  as c o n ­
t ras ted  wi th  the two m i l l i on  o r  m ore  invo lved  in the 
M o z a m b iq u e -A ng o la -E th io p ia /E r i t r ea -S o m a l ia  cases.  Aga in ,  the p ro b lem  
of get t ing  rehab i l i ta t ion  su pp o r t  to whe re  it is needed  - peop le  at r isk or  
t h e i r  l i ve l iho od 's  home areas - appears  to be the most  d i f f icul t  p rob le m .  
One key e lement in such re s t ruc tu r ing  is p ro m p t  response,  both to save 
l ives and to ensure  peop le  can be helped  on the spot , ra the r  than be 
fo rced  to leave th e i r  h om es  to rece ive  su rv iva l  assistance.  The lat ter  
g rea t ly  ham pers  re turn  to h om es  and l i ve l ihood  rehab i l i ta t ion  and,  fo r  
so m e  people,  p revents  it.
The f inanc ia l  im p l i ca t ions  of these s t ruc tura l  shif ts are unclear .  Whi le 
m o re  phys ical  suppor t  is needed ,  be t te r  fo rw a rd  p lann ing and dom es t ic  
log is t ica l  capaci ta t ion  w ou ld  re duce  uni t  costs (especia l ly  on t ranspo r t )  
w h i le  de l i ve ry  near  hom es  (avert ing  o r  l im i t ing  stays in camps) w ou ld  
p e rm i t  m ore  rapid re turn  to se l f - re l iance  and  thus mean sh o r te r  cal ls on 
ass is tance.
(13) Food secur i t y  is c lose ly  l inked to pove r ty  and to the s t ruc tura l  changes  
in e m e rg en c y  aid.  M o s t  a b s o lu te l y  p o o r  p e o p le  are ru ra l  re s iden ts ;  o v e r  
h a l f  a re  w a r  o r  n a tu ra l  c a la m i t y  a f f l i c ted .  For  them, food en t i t le m en ts  
w i l l  come f ro m  food p ro d u c t io n  o r  su rv iv a l  a id ... o r  not at al l .  For  the 
u rb a n  abso lu te ly  poo r ,  m o r e  jo b s ,  l i v ing  w ages  and (part ly  c o n s e q u e n ­
t ia l l y )  a m o re  p ro d u c t i v e  u rb an  fa m i l y  ' e n te r p r i s e '  se c to r  (a r t isanal  and 
c o m m e rc ia l )  are needed ,  as cash is the basic key to food  ent i t lements .
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Ne ithe r  p ro b le m  re q u i res  m a jo r  t e ch n o lo g ica l  b re a k th ro u g h s .  Access to 
inputs,  marke ts ,  t ra nsp o r t ,  basic se rv ices  and  fa i r  p r i c e s /w a g e s  (i.e. not 
g r ie v o u s ly  d is to r ted  by marke t  fa i lu re  o r  fa i led  a t te m p ts  to offset it) 
shou ld  resu l t  in 4 %  ave ra g e  annua l  food p ro d u c t io n  inc re ase s  over  the 
next  decade .  Overa l l  e c o n o m ic  rev iva l  and  subs t i tu t ion  of local  fo r  im ­
por ted  g ra in  shou ld  assure  ade qua te  u rban  marke ts .  R esea rch  and ex­
ten s io n  b u i ld -up  are c ruc ia l  but, because the  shel f  of tes ted ,  costed, 
u s e r - f r i e n d ly  k n o w le d g e  to extend  is l im i ted ,  the  u rg e n c y  is to have the 
p ip e l ine  bui l t  up by 1995-2000.
B ecau se  do m e s t i c  food  cons is ts  la rge ly  of  sm a l l - s ca le  p ro d u c t io n  by 
p o o r  peop le  wi th  - on ave ra g e  - 7 5 %  c o n s u m e d  in the  househo ld  or  
c o m m e rc ia l i s e d  loca l ly ,  the sw ing  f ro m  rh e to r i ca l  s u p p o r t  to enab l ing  
su p p o r t  (both in A f r i ca  and  g lo ba l l y )  is v e ry  la rge ly  yet  to be a r t icu la ted 
and  ac ted upon.  Food  a id  needs  to be c o n v e r t e d  f ro m  the  s u rv iv a l  core  
of e m e rg e n c y  ass is tance  to a m o re  so ph is t i ca ted  f oo d  s e c u r i t y  and  ru ra l  
l i v e l i h o o d  re h a b i l i t a t i o n  a nd  d e v e lo p m e n t  t o o l  on the  bas is  of nat ional ly  
d e s ign e d  s t ra teg ies  n ego t ia ted  w i th  p ro v ide rs .  In the  cases  of big rec ip ­
ients,  phase  d o w n s  wi l l  take  long e n ou gh  to a l lo w  p la n n in g  of subst i tute 
fo rm s  of resou rce  t rans fe rs  w h e re  a p p ro p r ia te ,  e.g. M o z a m b iq u e  has 
pe rha p s  two m i l l io n  ton nes  of g ra in  and roo t  c rop  g ra in  e qu iva len t  p ro ­
duc t ion ,  v e rs u s  the  m in im u m  th ree  m i l l ion  w h ic h  are  n e e d ed .  A bou t  half 
the  gap is food  a id and hal f  hunger .  If - w i th  peace and  ru ra l  renabi l i -  
ta t ion  - 2000 ou tpu t  was  6 7 %  above  1991, p o p u la t i o n  up 2 5 %  and the 
h u n g e r  gap  f i l led ,  the  food  a id need w o u ld  re m a in  at ha l f  a m i l l i o n  tonnes 
a l tho u gh  it w o u ld  then  beg in  to dec l ine  ra p id l y  if the  g ro w th  food  p ro ­
duc t io n  re m a in e d  wel l  above  that  of popu la t io n .
(14) D e m o b i l i s a t io n  s u pp o r t  is a re la t ive ly  new c o n ce p tu a l  a pp ro a c h .  It has 
been b ro ug h t  on to the  a g e n da  by M o z a m b ic a n  in i t ia t ives ,  tentat ive 
Swiss c o m m i tm e n ts  to he lp  su pp o r t  them  and J a p a n 's  h igh -p ro f i le  p ro ­
posa ls  to re la te  a id to re d uce d  m i l i t a r y  s p e n d in g .  In w a r -e n d in g  and  
p o s t - w a r  c o n d i t i o n s  in SSA (e.g. A n g o la ,  M o z a m b iq u e ,  Somal ia,  
E th io p ia /E r i t rea ,  Sudan,  L iber ia ,  U ganda  and  R w a n d a )  e n d in g  w a r  shou ld 
lead to the  d e m o b i l i s a t io n  of most  c o m b a ta n ts  (and the  re t r ieva l  of the i r  
a rms) .  That  cal ls  f o r  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n  a l lo w a n ce s ,  p lus  e d uca t ion  and 
l i ve l ih o o d  re h a b i l i ta t io n  suppo r t .  W i thou t  t he se  it m ay  be im p o ss ib le  to 
co n v inc e  m i l i t a r y  fo rces  ( rebel  o r  g o v e rn m e n t )  to lay d o w n  guns  fo r  hoes 
o r  saws,  and  to avo id  pub l i c  s e c to r  w a r  t u r n in g  into p r i v a t i s e d  a rm ed 
band i t ry .
Fu r the r ,  w i th o u t  gene ra l  re h ab i l i ta t io n  of the  l i v e l i h o o d s  of war- 
d is loca te d  and  p a u p e r i s ed  peop le ,  secur i t y  wi l l  at best  be f ragi le .  Too 
m an y  guns  are too  access ib le  and  too m a n y  g r ie v a n c e s  re m a in  clear ly  
in m e m o r y  to expec t  s tagnan t  pove r ty  and re c u r re n t  p a u p e r i s a t io n  to be 
s tab le  o r  peaceful .
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C le a r  p le dg e s  o f  d e m o b i l i s a t io n  and  re h ab i l i ta t io n  a id  (e.g. by Japan and 
Sw i tze r land )  ava i lab le  to States wi th  peace and secur i ty  res to ra t ion  
p r o g r a m m e s  wou ld  both fac i l i ta te and s t im u la te  peace (and a l low  m i l i t a ry  
s p e n d in g  cuts) w i thou t  r e q u i r in g  deta i led  p le dge r  know ledge  of, o r  
In te rven t ion  in, the h is to r ico -con tex tua l  d ynam ics  of peace/conf l ic t  re s o l ­
u t ion  p rocesses  at the  po l i t i c o -m i l i ta ry  level.
(15) E n v i ro n m e n t  is a top ic  on w h ic h  the re  is m o re  agreem en t  than may be 
ap pa ren t .  It is an A f r ican  (not a Nor thern )  t rad i t ion  that  the Earth is in ­
her i ted  f rom  the ances to rs  in t rus t  fo r  the succeed ing  genera t ions .  It is 
a fact  that  need (often as a resu l t  of some land am asser 's  g reed) is the 
m a in  cause of forest  and bush d es t ruc t ion  and neo-deser t i f i ca t ion  in 
SSA. There  is g ro w in g  rea l i sa t ion  that  if p o o r  peop le  are to p rom o te  
c o ns e rv a t io n  then they  must  be e m p o w e re d  to do so and to have m a te ­
r ial  incen t ives  to make it wo r th  t he i r  wh i le .  Nor thern  conserva t ion is ts  
and  g loba l  w a rm in g  l im i ta t ion  advoca tes  are  com in g  to accept  that the 
r i c h e r  coun t r ie s  must  pay most  of the b i l ls fo r  p rese rv ing  ' the c o m m o n  
her i tage  of  m a n k in d ' ,  in c lu d ing  c l im ate  as well  as rh inoceroses .  H o w ­
ever .  the s te reo types  of the  na tu re -des t ro y in g  A f r ican  and the 
co nse rva t io n is t  eager to save c ro cod i les  and  anophe le s  m osqu i tos  (not 
A f r i can  ch i ld ren)  o r  to b lock  tsetse  f ly con t ro l  to in o rd e r  to force back 
catt le and w iden  gam e rese rves ,  con t inue  to bedevi l  d is course  and ac­
tua l  p ro g r a m m e  ar t icu la t ion .
Poss ib le  e lements  inc lude :  ro ta t ional ,  se lec t ive  cut t ing  of forests wi th 
para l l e l  rep lan t ing  (which makes  shor t - te rm ,  h ighes t  b id d e r  cont racts  fo r  
l o g g in g  qui te in app ropr ia te ) :  m ixed  gam e/ca t t l e  ranch ing  wi th m a jo r  ex ­
por t  de ve lo p m e n t  fo r  g am e  meat  (and fo r  hun t ing  in these com m erc ia l  
areas) ;  ag reed  p rese rva t ion  p r o g r a m m e s  fo r  w i lde rn ess  areas  and wi ld 
an im a l  conse rva t io n  a reas  wi th  co m p a t ib le  tour i s t  p ro g ra m m e s  and 
sp in -o f f  benef i ts  to res iden t  o r  n e ig h b o u r in g  popu la t ions  (with, as a c o r ­
o l la ry ,  re s to ra t io n  of a co nse rva t io n - re la te d  legal ivo ry  t rade ,  whose  
benef i ts  pay A f r i can  fa rm e rs  nea r  game reserves,  and fo r  an ima l  p ro ­
tec t io n  serv ices) ;  research  on ef f ic ient  househo ld  and v i l l age  sy lv icu l t u re  
jo in t l y  m ee t ing  f u e l / f o d d e r / fo o d /b u i l d in g  mater ia l  needs;  w a te r  d e v e lo p ­
ment,  use, conse rva t io n  (espec ia l l y  sma l l - sca le  but a lso u rb a n /m in in g  to 
a l loca te  nat ional  supp l ies  and  to enco u ra ge  conserva t ion  by pr ice  and 
o th e r  ra t ion ing) ;  land res to ra t io n  to reve rse  neo-deser t i f i ca t ion .  In each 
a rea  part ia l ,  a r t icu la ted  p ro g r a m m e s  and some wo rk ing  p ro jec ts  exist . 
A f r i ca n  in terest  ex ists too  - but  not  A f r i can  funds.  Debt  wr i te -o f f  a lone  
wi l l  not  do - new cash in jec t ions  (and s om e  TA support  fo r  inst i tu t ion  
b u i ld ing ,  research,  in te r im  personne l)  are needed.
(16) P op u la t ion  pol icy  is an area in wh ich  the re  is enough  subs tan t ive  
a g r e e m e n t  fo r  m ean ing fu l  coope ra t ion :  large n um bers  of b i r ths per
m o th e r  are bad fo r  househo ld  health,  land use pract ice and f inanc ia l
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safety at m ic ro - le ve l  and ,  na t iona l ly ,  they  pose m a c ro -h e a l th  e n v i ro n ­
menta l  and bas ic se rv ice  f inance  p ro b lem s .  The m a in  p ro b le m  - on both 
s ides - is p ro b a b ly  one of too  n a r r o w  an a p p ro a c h .  D e m a n d  fo r  chi ld 
spac ing ,  as we l l  as supp ly  of enab l in g  i n fo rm a t io n  and  te c h n o lo g y ,  needs 
to be in c reased .  On h is to r ic  (and p ro b a b ly  SSA) e xp e r ie n c e ,  reduced 
in fant  m o r ta l i t y ,  in c reased  life expec tancy ,  r e d uc e d  s e v e re  ma lnu t r i t ion ,  
e x te n de d  fem a le  e du ca t ion  and  access to o ld -ag e  se c u r i t y  f ro m  sources 
b eyond  o ne 's  su rv iv in g  c h i ld re n  are c ruc ia l  of r e d u c in g  popu la t ion  
g ro w th  (via sh r in k in g  des i red  co m p le te d  fam i l y  size).  There fo re ,  most  
b as ic  s e rv ic e s  a nd  p o v e r t y  re d u c t io n  p r o g r a m m e s  a re  a t  le a s t  as c ruc ia l  
to p o p u la t i o n  p ra x is  as the  i t e m s  usua l l y  l i s te d  u n d e r  p o p u la t i o n  pol icy.  
At  p ro m o t i o n a l  level,  an odd  inve r ted  g e n d e r  b ias l im i ts  e f fec t iveness  - 
ed u c a t io n  is on ly  p e r ip h e ra l l y  d i rec ted  at men,  t h o u g h  e v id e n c e  suggests 
they  have  a la rge  in f luence  on w h e th e r  ch i ld  spac ing  is p ra c t i ced  and are 
- on a v e ra g e  - d is t inc t l y  less aw are  of. o r  c o n v in c e d  of, i ts va lue  than 
w o m e n .
(17) Hea l th  suf fers f rom  lack  o f  r e s o u r c e s  a nd  o f  v ia b le  s t r a te g i c  a pp ro a che s  
with  c o n s i s te n t  o p e r a t i o n a l  back ing .  Hea l th  fo r  al l ,  u n ive rsa l  p r im ary  
hea l th  care,  p r iva t i sa t ion  and  fees, ho l i s t ic  a p p r o a c h e s  a nd  iso la ted ' s i l ­
v e r  bu l le t '  a p p ro a c h e s  (e.g. un iversa l  im m u n is a t i o n ,  A IDS educa t ion ,  
m o th e r - c h i l d  (wel l  ch i ld )  c l in ics ,  c o m m u n i t y  hea l th  w o rk e rs )  opera ted 
ve r t i c a l l y  in w ays  wh ich  f ra gm en t  ra the r  than  bu i ld  up na t io na l ,  p rov inc ia l  
o r  local  hea l th  sys tems,  are  all heav i ly  a d v o c a te d ,  s o m e t im e s  by the 
sam e  M in is t r i e s  and agenc ies .  More  c o h e re n t  p la n n in g ,  lead ing  to 
p rac t ice  w h ich  dec ides  on,  p r io r i t i ses  and re la tes  (by t ra de -o f f s  if noth ing 
e lse)  these  m easures ,  is urgen t .  External  ass is tan ce  is n e e d e d  on import  
con ten t  (equ ipm en t ,  v e h ic le s  and  fuel,  as we l l  as d r u g s  and  o the r  sup­
pl ies) and research  and t ra in in g .  It is not  n ee d ed  f o r  im p o s in g  'un i ­
v e rs a l '  goa ls  cast  into in f le x ib le  ta rge ts  and  p r o g r a m m e s ,  p a r t i cu la r l y  as 
re g a rd s  p r iva t i sa t ion  (se lec t ive ly  useful  as a safety va lve ,  but  i r re levant  
to 9 0 %  of A f r i ca ns  fo r  cost  reasons) and  d o m e s t i c  f inance .  User fees 
need to a p p ro a c h  as c lose ly  as poss ib le  a s e m i - i n s u r a n c e  sys tem (e.g. 
an annua l  h ou s e h o ld  levy ra th e r  than  po in t  of use c h a r g e s  in low income 
areas) .  Fu r the r ,  the re  is no m ora l  re a so n  to p re fe r  sma l l ,  hard- to-  
a d m in i s te r  fees,  to large,  e asy - to -a d m in is te r ,  taxe s  (e.g. sa les  tax boosts 
on hea l th  in h ib i te rs  such as a lcoho l ,  t o b a c c o  p r o d u c ts  a nd  au tomob i les ,  
o r  a po r t ion  of local g o v e rn m e n t  land ren ts  a nd  b u i l d i n g  rates)  and there 
are  of ten a d m in i s t r a t i v e  and  c o l le c t io n /co s t  ra t io  e f f i c iency  reasons  to 
p re fe r  the  lat ter.
AIDS is a sub- top ic  w i th in  hea l th  but, w i th  up to 2 5 -30 %  of adults  
HIV-a f f l ic ted  in so m e  SSA co un t r ie s  and the  A f r i ca n  a v e r a g e  l ike ly  to be 
6 -8 %  (up to 25 m i l l ion  adu l t s ) ,  it is not  a m i n o r  top ic .  Bu t  h igh- tech ap­
p ro a ch e s  canno t  be g e n e ra l i s e d ;  c o n d o m  s u p p ly  s u p p o r t  seem s to con­
sist  of 1-2 p e r  adu l t  m a le  per  year ,  w h ic h  w o u ld  a p p e a r  somewhat
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i nadequa te :  effect ive e d uca t ion  is l ike ly  to be Afr ican des igned  and o p ­
e ra ted  (or  to f low  f rom the bru ta l  rea l i t y  of bu ry ing  re lat ives).  The useful  
ex te rna l  con t r ibu t io n  w o u ld  be to keep  A f r ic a  on the resea rch  a nd  p r e ­
ve n t ive  d ru g /v a c c in e  d e v e lo p m e n t  a gendas .  That p roba b iy  requ i res  
adap t i ve  research  in A f r i ca  ( in c lud in g  by non-A f r icans)  and su bs id ie s  to 
A f r ican  HIV s t ra in -o r ien ted  p reven t ion  d ru gs /va cc in e  d e v e lo p m en t  and 
p ro d u c t io n  (not necessar i l y  in Afr ica) .
These  are  p o in ts  fo r  an A f r i c a n - g lo b a l  a g en da  f o r  d ia logue  to w a r d  a 1990s 
c o m p a c t .  C le a r ly  no such a g re e m e n t  can be b ind ing ,  no r  can it in c lu de  
g ua ra n te e s  as to resul ts.  At ove ra l l  level it cannot  take into account  every  
con tex tua l  spec i f i c i ty  o r  de ta i led  fu tu re  re sponses  to unfo reseen fu tu re  
even ts .  To a t tempt  to do so w o u ld  be to lose what  is a t ta inab le  - a f r a m e w o rk  
w i th in  wh ich  A f r ican  States can take the in i t ia t ive  in des ign in g  coun t ry  
p r o g r a m m e s  wi th a reasonab le  expe c ta t ion  of pos i t ive  exte rna l  response  
le a d in g  to sets of opera t iona l  a g ree m e n ts ,  p le dges  and cont racts.  However ,  
f o r  that  to happen ,  fou r  changes  wh ich  re late to at t i tudes  and app roa che s  
ra th e r  than to subs tance  and sec to rs  are needed :
(1) O pe ra t iona l  (as well  as ve rba l)  accep tance  that  Afr i can  in i t ia t i ves  wi l l  not 
a lw ays  be what  d ono rs  ( in te rna t iona l ,  b i la tera l ,  g lobal  o r  NGO) w ou ld  
have expec ted  or  selec ted ;  that  th is  is a potent ia l  s t reng th ,  not nece s ­
sa r i l y  a w eakness  or  an eccen t r ic i t y ;  and that unless d ia logue  and p ro ­
g r a m m in g  p roceed on that basis t he i r  conc lus ions  and cont rac ts  wi l l  
have no last ing base in Afr i ca ;
(2) A v o id a n c e  of f ash io ns  w h ich  re w o rk  old concepts  in new w o rd s  and 
o v e r -e m p h a s iz e  the i r  ow n  nove l  aspects,  at the pr ice  of ve ry  subs tant ia l  
in te l lec tua l  and  ins t i tu t iona l  con fus io n  on in t roduc t io n ;  d is i l l us ion  on in ­
t r o d u c t io n  of a new fash ion ,  a b a n d o n in g  wha t  was va l id  as wel l  as what  
was  u n so u nd  or  hype in the  o ld;  c yn ic ism  when old fash ions  s u d d e n ly  
re a pp e a r ;  and a loss of s tab i l i t y  and inc rem enta l  bu i ld ing  on what  has 
been  ach ieved  th ro u g h o u t  the  cycle. The va lue of new s logans  and 
p re sen ta t io ns  to renew  a t ten t ion  and ref ine app roaches  is one th ing ;  the 
cos t  o f  d i sco n t in uou s ,  n o n -c u m u la t i v e  c h an g es  in e m p h a s is  is ano the r.
(3) The re la ted accep tance  tha t  the re  are no s imp le ,  gen e ra l ,  fas t  ' s i l v e r  
b u l l e t '  so lu t ion s  e x c ep t  w ro n g  ones.  Im ba lances  in one d i rec t ion  are not 
cu re d  by equal  and opp os i te  new im ba lances .  For example ,  pre-1980 
u n d e re m p h a s is  on m a c ro -e c o n o m ic  ba lance  requ ired  act ion  but  the  ear ly  
1980s'  t e n d e n cy  to be l ieve  - to m od i fy  K w a m e  Nk ru m ah 's  b ib l ica l  p a ra ­
phrase ,  "seek  ye f irst  the k in g d o m  of m a c ro -e con o m ic  stabi l i ty  and  of the 
m a rke t  and all else shal l  be adde d  unto ye",  was ve ry  much a mistake,  
too .  M u l t ip le  ac t ions on m u l t ip le  levels a re  requ ired .  For  exam p le ,  the 
fa i l u re  o f  m a n y  m a n a g e d  m a r k e t  and  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  m e a s u r e s  to cope  
w ith  m a r k e t  fa i lu re  in SSA is a fac t  a nd  r e q u i r e s  co r rec t iv e  ac t ion  bu t  it
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does  not  so lve  the  g e n u in e  p r o b le m s  wh ich  the  m a r k e t  fa i lu res  caused  
a nd  c o n t in u e  to cause ,  n o r  does  it obv ia te  the  need to f ind  m o re  effect ive 
and  less cost ly  marke t  f ra m e  o r  l imi t  se t t ing  and  m a n a g e m e n t  in ter­
ven t ions .
(4) O u ts id e rs  and,  in p a r t i c u la r ,  o u ts id e  in s t i t u t io n s ,  (p ub l i c  o r  pr iva te) ,  
c a n n o t  be  fu l ly  a c c o u n ta b le  to A f r i c a n s  (as we l l  as to t h e i r  own  members ,  
fund e rs ,  e lec to ra tes)  and shou ld  n e i the r  p u r p o r t  to be, n o r  act as if they 
w e re  - least of al l  if they  have confused  th e m s e lv e s  into be l iev ing  they 
are  va l id  re p resen ta t i ve s  of o r d in a r y  A f r i ca n  peop le  a ga in s t  A f r i ca 's  own 
c ivi l  soc ie t ies  and g o v e rn m e n ta l  in s t i tu t ions .  The te m p ta t io n  to play the 
ro le  of P la ton ic  G ua rd ia n  runs  deep  - and  is by no rea son  a lw ays  self- 
se rv in g  - but  it is a road  to conf l i c t  and a w ay  f r o m  ca pa c i t y -b u i ld in g  by 
A f r i cans  in Af r ica ,  w h e th e r  the capac i t y  is f o r  fu n c t io n in g  rep re sen ta ­
t iona l  s ys tem s  o r  fo r  f u n c t io n in g  e m e rg e n c y  ass is ta n ce  t ra n s p o r t  units. 
A d v o c a c y ,  adv ice ,  techn ica l  ass is tance  and  p r o v i s io n  of  agreed  (and 
l im i ted )  ope ra t io n a l  se rv ices  at t im es  are  c lose to rep re sen ta t io n ,  com ­
m an d  g iv ing ,  d o ing  it f o r  th e m  and ru n n in g  e v e ry th in g ,  but  ma in ta in ing  
the d i f fe rence  is f u n d am en ta l .
S im p ly  a p p ly in g  m o re  re so u rce s  o r  m o re  p re s s u re  wi l l  not  do  the job  in the 
1990s any  m o re  than  s im p ly  ra is in g  g ross  f ixed  capi ta l  f o r m a t i o n  levels and 
ex te rna l  b o r r o w in g  d id the  job  in the  late 1970s. S t ruc tu ra l  ad jus tm e n t  and 
t r a n s fo rm a t io n  are as u rg e n t l y  needed  in A f r i c a n / c o - o p e r a t i n g  pa r tne r  re­
la t ions ,  p r o g r a m m e s ,  p r io r i t i e s  and p r o c e d u re s  as in a n y  o th e r  area of 
A f r i ca n  e c o n o m ic  st ra tegy,  po l ic y  and  praxis.  W i th o u t  the m ,  reso u rce  t ra ns ­
fe r  in c reases  can ensu re  su rv iva l  and can p lug  the  im p o r t / s a v in g s  gaps in 
som e  o th e rw is e  v ia b le  na t iona l  exe rc ises  - but  no m o re .  They  wi l l  lead nei­
th e r  to su s ta in a b i l i t y  and s t ruc tu ra l  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  of p ro d u c t io n ,  no r  to rapid 
re d uc t io n  of abso lu te  pove r ty .  H ow ever ,  the case  is not  e i th e r /o r ,  ra ther  it is 
bo th /an d .  M o re  re so u rce  in f lows (the 4 %  ta rge t )  and  less ou t f low s  (the ex­
te rna l  wr i te -o f fs)  are cruc ia l  to the  qua l i ty  a nd  re a l lo c a t io n  t rans fo rm a t io n  
ta rge ts  be ing  a ch ieved .  To crea te  an e nab l in g  c l im a te  fo r  m o re  eff icient  re­
source  use in A f r ica  - and e spec ia l l y  fo r  ac t ing  on a m e d iu m - te r m  strategy 
ra the r  than  on a day - to -day  o r  ye a r - to - y ea r  c r is is  c o n ta in m e n t  and survival  
basis - does  re q u i re  m o re  re s o u rc e s  to be m a d e  ava i lab le .
Envoi
On the  o ve ra l l  reco rd  of the  1980s, the re  is l i t t le  cause  f o r  op t im ism .  On 
c lo se r  inspec t ion ,  the  1986-90 e c o n o m ic  re c o rd  in mos t  A f r i c a n  countr ies 
looks less u n p r o m is i n g  (even if st i l l  p ro b le m a t i c )  as a base fo r  renewed 
p rog ress .  On goa ls  p lus  p r o g r a m m a t i c  w ays  and  m eans ,  the  real i ty  of a 
v e h e m e n t  d i v e rg e n c e  ea r ly  in the  d ecad e  has n ow  n a r r o w e d  and .  to a de­
gree,  that  n a r ro w in g  is re co g n is e d  by most  d e c i s io n - ta k e r s  (even if not by
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m a ny  rh e to r i c ians  and pub l i c is ts  on pol i t ica l ,  academic  and jou rna l i s t i c  
s tumps) .
But  on h o w  to conduc t  a d ia lo g u e  le a d in g  to a w o rkab le  two-v /ay  co m p ac t ,  
a n d  h o w  to a v o id  be ing  p r e s e n te d  a nd  p u s h e d  and  p r o g r a m m e d  in ways  
a m o u n t in g  to d o m in a t io n  and  how  to aver t  reac t ions  to it being p resented  
(not  a lw ays  e r ron eou s ly )  as last d i tch  res is tance  to a new co lon ia l  era,  it is 
h a r d e r  to be op t im is t ic  that  pe rcep t io n  gaps  are na r row ing  o r  that  there  are 
c le a r  e x am p les  of par t ia l  successes  on wh ich  to bui ld.  Perhaps the inquest  
on UN P A A ER D  can p ro v id e  such an oppo r tun i t y .  Because  it real ly  was UN­
PAID, the  po in t  that  A f r i c a 's  s u r v i v a l  a nd  p a r t i a l  t u r n a ro u n d  has  been  p r i ­
m a r i l y  an A f r i c a n  a c h ie v e m e n t  a n d  one  cos t l y  p r im a r i l y  to A f r i cans  shou ld  
be m o d e r a te ly  easy to recogn ise .  F rom that cou ld  f low accep tance  that  m o re  
A f r i c a n  l e a d e rs h ip  in p r o g r a m m e  des ign  and  in m o n i to r in g  e x te rn a l  inpu ts  
( in c lu d in g  p e r s o n n e l )  is c rucia l  both to ef f i c iency of reach ing  ob jec t ives  and 
to accou n tab i l i t y .  The need fo r  inputs  - in c lud ing  know ledge  - to speed (or, 
in the  w a r - r a v a g e d  count r ies ,  secure)  socia l and econom ic  recovery  and the 
fact  that , to m ob i l i se  these  inputs,  it is necessary  to take into accoun t  the 
v ie w s  of coop e ra t ing  par tners ,  are a l ready  re cogn ised ,  on ly  too  c lear ly ,  on 
the  A f r ican  side.
Both  A f r ica  and - perhaps  to a s l igh t ly  lesser, and ce r ta in ly  less eviden t ,  ex ­
tent  - the  rest  of the  w o r ld  have no op t ion  but to cont inue  the ques t  fo r  A f r ican  
recove ry .  'A luta co n t in ua '  ( the s t rugg le  cont inues)  is a w o rk in g  and 
m o b i l i s in g  rea l i t y  - as d e m o n s t ra te d  in one  of its a u th o r  coun tr ies,  
M o z a m b iq u e  - fo r  l i bera t ion  f ro m  co lon ia l  ru le in the 1960-75 per iod ;  tow ard  
t ra n s i t i o n  to d e v e lo p m e n t  d u r in g  1975-80; fo r  su rv iva l  aga inst  Sou th -A fr ican  
m a n a g e d  agg ress ive  t e r ro r i s m  f ro m  1981-87; in suppor t  of pol i t ica l ,  social  
and  e c o n o m ic  rehab i l i ta t ion  toda y .  U n d e r  m o re  favou rab le  cond i t ions ,  the 
B o tsw a n a  evoca t ion  of T u l a !  Pula!  Pula! '  (Water,  Weal th,  We l lbe ing)  has 
p ro v e n  to be at least m o d e s t ly  and g ra d u a l l y  at ta inab le.  Surv iva l  in 
M o z a m b iq u e  and b ro a d e r  success  in B o tsw ana  - fu l ly  recogn is in g  the i r  l im i ­
ta t io ns  - are exam p le s  of las t ing A f r ican  a ch ievem ents  wh ich  shou ld  impel  
the  m e m b e rs  of the in te rna t iona l  co m m u n i t y ,  both on mora l  g ro u n d s  and in 
t h e i r  own  se l f - in terest ,  to put in p lace a s t ruc tu ra l l y  ad jus ted  and t ra ns fo rm e d  
s u c c e s s o r  to UNPAAERD.
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